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War and Peace in the Jury Room:
How Capital Juries Reach Unanimity
Scott E. Sundby*
Using data from the Capital Jury Project, this Article takes a close look inside the jury
room at the process by which capital juries reach a unanimous verdict at the penalty
phase. The Article first examines the relationship between first ballot voting patterns
and the ultimate sentence, then explores the dynamics of group interaction in achieving
unanimity. In particular, by using the jurors’ own narratives, the piece delves into the
psychological process and arguments through which the majority jurors persuade the
holdouts to change their votes. This process is especially intriguing because individual
juries do not, of course, have any training in how to deliberate and reach unanimity,
and yet they are strikingly similar from case to case in how they convert holdouts to the
majority position (with striking differences between the dynamics of juries that reach a
verdict of death and those that return a sentence of life without parole). Using the
closing argument in the death penalty case of Susan Smith (a mother who did the
unthinkable, killing her two children by driving them into a lake and then trying to cast
blame on a mysterious black man), the Article concludes by examining how a closing
argument might address many of the pressures that affect holdouts.

* Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
The Author has benefitted from input from workshops at the law schools at Washington University in
St. Louis; University of North Carolina; University of California, Hastings College of the Law; DePaul
University School of Law; University of Miami School of Law, and the legal psychology department at
Florida International University.
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“These people were converted.”
—Juror describing the life holdouts’ change in vote.

Introduction
If a social scientist were to study group decisionmaking by isolating
twelve people in a cramped room, giving them an emotionally charged
issue, and then barring them from resuming their daily lives until they
unanimously agreed upon a resolution, the researcher quickly would be
drummed out of the academy for abusing basic guidelines on
experiments with human subjects. Yet, this essentially is what the current
criminal justice system does with a jury. Granted, jurors no longer are
routinely locked up, as in the fourteenth century, “without meat, drink,
1
fire, or candle, or conversation with others,” or placed in an oxcart until
1. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 75 (4th ed. 2002) (internal

Sundby_62-HLJ-103.doc (Do Not Delete)

November 2010]

WAR & PEACE IN THE JURY ROOM

1/7/2011 12:10 PM

105

2

they reach a verdict. Today’s jurors, however, are still asked to
deliberate and decide cases under conditions that create a crucible for
bringing out the best and the worst in human behavior. Not surprisingly,
therefore, juries have become a subject of fascination not only for the
lawyers who practice before them, but also for anyone interested in
individual and group behavior.
Perhaps nowhere is the fascination greater than with the capital jury
as it struggles to decide whether a defendant deserves to die for the
crimes of which he has been convicted. How the jury works its way to
unanimity in choosing between a life and death sentence is important not
only for the lawyers who litigate capital cases, but also for the criminal
justice system as a whole. Only by understanding the dynamics of what
happens in the jury room and what factors influence whether a death or
life sentence ultimately emerges can we begin to make a rational
assessment of how our system of capital punishment is working.
This Article uses extensive interviews conducted through the
3
Capital Jury Project (“CJP”) with jurors who served on capital juries to
see how twelve jurors work their way to unanimity on a verdict of life or
death once the jury room door closes. The CJP data will show that even
though the jurors are given little guidance on how they should conduct
their deliberations, individual juries tend to conduct their deliberative
processes in a surprisingly consistent manner, both in how they structure
the process and in the arguments that are raised in the jury room.
Discovering how alike capital juries are in their techniques for reaching
unanimity at the penalty phase may come as a bit of a surprise. After all,
jurors do not have any way of benefitting from other juries’ experiences,
but must learn and adapt as they deliberate. Yet, time after time, as the
majority was trying to change the holdouts’ votes, the stories were
remarkably similar, and it was as if the juries had taken a Jury Penalty
Deliberations 101 course followed by an advanced Holdout Persuasion
Theory seminar.
While the syllabus’s precise content varied from case to case, and
especially between life and death cases, the course had five basic steps.
The first step involved the uniting of the majority jurors whose views
ultimately were to prevail into a consolidated and strong viewpoint. The
second stage revolved around isolating those jurors resisting the

quotation marks omitted).
2. See United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 665 (5th Cir. 1972).
3. The Capital Jury Project is a nationwide study funded by the National Science Foundation,
and since 1992, has interviewed over 1200 jurors in fourteen states. Capital Jury Project, S.U.N.Y.
Albany: Sch. of Criminal Justice, http://www.albany.edu/scj/CJPhome.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2010). See generally William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 Ind. L.J. 1043 (1995) (describing CJP’s purposes and procedures).

Sundby_62-HLJ-103.doc (Do Not Delete)

106

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/7/2011 12:10 PM

[Vol. 62:103

majority’s arguments and focusing the spotlight on the holdouts in an
effort to show them that they must have taken a wrong turn in arriving at
their conclusion. The third phase entailed the “conversion” of the
holdouts to the majority’s viewpoint, a moment often marked by extreme
emotion. The fourth stage consisted of the majority jurors providing
support to the holdouts and of the holdouts reconciling themselves as
best they could to the verdict. The final step was the announcement of
the unanimous verdict in open court, an event frequently fraught with
high drama and for which juries sometimes tried to prepare in an effort
to protect their hard-fought verdict.
In undertaking the examination of how capital juries work their way
to unanimity, this Article proceeds through seven parts. Part I explores
the relationship between the jury’s vote on the first ballot at the penalty
phase and the ultimate verdict of a life or death sentence. Part II sets the
scene for the jury’s deliberations by describing how juries organize and
debate the evidence and arguments that they have heard regarding
whether the defendant should live or die. Part III explains how two
factors, worries over the defendant’s future dangerousness and the desire
to avoid a hung jury, form the backdrop for almost every jury’s
deliberations. Part IV then delves into the step-by-step process through
which majority jurors favoring a death sentence convince jurors holding
out for a life sentence to eventually switch their vote to death. Part V
undertakes the mirror image analysis of how jurors favoring life persuade
holdouts for a death sentence to change their vote. Part VI looks at the
emotionally difficult process that juries go through in preparing for the
announcement of the verdict, sometimes even conducting a dress
rehearsal of being polled by the judge. The final Part examines what
lawyers can learn from understanding how capital juries deliberate and
how lawyers might use those lessons in the courtroom. This part uses as
its centerpiece an analysis of how the defense lawyer’s closing argument
4
at the penalty phase of the Susan Smith trial, a South Carolina case
where a mother killed her two young children and initially claimed they
5
had been kidnapped, incorporates those lessons.
The data for this Article is primarily drawn from interviews with 152
jurors in thirty-seven cases in California where the death penalty was
sought—nineteen of which resulted in an imposition of a death sentence,
seventeen of which led to a sentence of life without parole (“LWOP”),
6
and one case that ended in a hung jury over the penalty. Unless

4. State v. Smith, Nos. 94-GS-44-906, 94-GS-44-907, 1995 WL 467562, at *1 (S.C. Apr. 10, 1995)
(regarding an evidentiary issue).
5. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
6. The Author served as the Principal Investigator for the California segment of the CJP. Each
juror participated in an interview that, on average, lasted three hours, answering questions designed to
elicit both qualitative and quantitative data regarding how their jury deliberated and which factors
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otherwise noted, cited statistics and data are from the California segment
of the study. All statements in quotations are the actual words of the
7
interviewed jurors.

I. First Ballot Thresholds for Death and Life Sentences
Most capital juries are destined to undergo a process of persuading
one or more jurors to change their votes to reach unanimity. In only 8%
of the studied cases were the juries unanimous on the first ballot at the
8
penalty phase, and most juries went through three or more rounds of
voting before unanimity was achieved. Thus, while many individual
jurors expressed surprise, sometimes bordering on shock, upon learning
9
that not all of their fellow jurors shared their viewpoint, the first ballot
usually served only as an early staging point for further deliberations.
The lack of unanimity on the first ballot, however, should not
obscure the importance of the first vote as a strong predictor of the final
outcome. On the most general level, in nine out of every ten cases (89%),
the jury’s penalty verdict followed the outcome favored by a majority of
jurors on the initial vote. This rate is almost identical to what Kalven and
Zeisel found for jury verdicts generally in their classic 1966 study, The
10
American Jury. Unlike guilt-innocence phase verdicts, however, a
capital jury’s penalty vote requires a significantly more nuanced
understanding of what the first vote portends.
Once the data is broken down further, one discovers that the
significance of the first vote tally differs significantly between life and
death verdicts. While a majority vote on the first ballot favoring a life
verdict essentially guarantees a life sentence as the final outcome, it turns
out that a majority vote for death on the initial ballot does not carry the
same guarantee. Indeed, a simple majority of seven votes for death on
the first ballot almost invariably portends the opposite outcome—that

influenced their decision. All data referenced in this Article are drawn from those interviews and the
CJP’s study.
7. The Author has verified all of the quotations in this Article for accuracy against the primary
source (i.e., the tape or interviewer’s notes). The Article’s descriptions of cases are based on the
jurors’ recollections. When necessary, the Author has bracketed material to protect the anonymity of
the jurors, or to clarify the context of the quotation. To protect confidentiality, the Author maintains a
file of all of the materials used in this Article.
8. For the thirty-seven California cases, juries reached unanimous verdicts in only three cases
(two death cases and one life case). Another state in the Capital Jury Project, South Carolina,
reported a 17% rate of unanimous first ballots at the penalty phase. See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen
P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward
the Death Penalty, 30 J. Legal Stud. 277, 303 (2001). While that rate is higher than California’s, the
finding still means that more than eight out of every ten juries had to deliberate beyond the first ballot.
9. As one juror commented after describing his surprise that the first ballot was not unanimous,
“I wondered what trial [the jurors voting the other way] had been listening to.” This juror’s
astonishment was not an unusual reaction.
10. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 487–89 (1966).
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eventually a life sentence will emerge from the jury room. As
summarized in Chart 1 below, the ninety CJP cases studied in California
and South Carolina showed a strikingly consistent pattern: Only when
the vote tally on the first ballot for death reaches a supermajority level
does the likelihood of a death sentence become manifest.
Chart 1
First Vote for Death and Final Verdict
(Combined California and South Carolina Data)

First Ballot
Votes for Death
9–12
8
0–7

Death Verdicts
12

35
10
2

11

Life Verdicts

Hung Jury

0
5
37

0
1
0

Viewed from the death side of the ledger, therefore, if nine or more
votes were cast for death on the initial ballot, the first ballot essentially
sealed the defendant’s fate. In every one of the fourteen California cases
in which nine or more jurors voted for death, the jury eventually
returned a unanimous verdict of death; a 100% death rate identical to
that found in South Carolina by Professors Eisenberg, Garvey and
13
Wells. The two states’ totals thus are particularly ominous for a
defendant where nine or more jurors on the jury vote for death: thirtyfive cases, thirty-five death sentences.
As the chart demonstrates, however, once the number of jurors
voting for death on the first ballot drops below a threshold of nine, the
likelihood of a death sentence correspondingly declines. If eight jurors
14
vote for death, approximately 60% of the cases will end in a death. And
once support for a death sentence on the initial ballot constitutes seven
or fewer votes, the likelihood of a death sentence drops dramatically:
15
Only two of eighteen California cases came back death. In South
Carolina, Eisenberg and colleagues reported an even sharper decline in
death sentences once support for a death sentence dropped to fewer than

11. The South Carolina data is from Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 303. South Carolina does
not have hung juries. Id. at 281 n.13. If a jury does not unanimously reach a verdict of death, a life
sentence is automatically imposed. Id.
12. Nine of these cases were unanimous votes for death; seven arose in South Carolina, and two
arose in California. Id.
13. Id. at 303.
14. Where eight jurors voted for death on the first ballot the combined California and South
Carolina totals were ten death, five life, and one hung. See supra Chart 1.
15. In these two cases, the first ballot votes were, in one case, seven votes for death and, in the
other case, five votes for death. In the latter case, however, five jurors also voted “undecided,” leaving
only two votes for life, a factor which heavily influences the likelihood of a death or life sentence. See
infra notes 19–22, 69–70 and accompanying text.
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eight votes: Not one of twenty-one cases resulted in a death sentence,
leaving a combined total of two death sentences out of thirty-nine cases
16
where seven or fewer jurors voted for death on the first ballot.
Because it takes eight or more votes for death before a death verdict
becomes likely, the corollary, of course, is that it will take significantly
fewer votes for life on the first ballot to tip the odds strongly in favor of a
life sentence. And this is evident from examining the California data in
Chart 2 from the reverse perspective of the number of votes cast for life
on the first ballot (the chart does not include South Carolina data as that
study did not report votes cast for life on the first ballot).
Chart 2
First Vote for Life and Final Verdict
(California Data)17

First Ballot
Votes For Life
5–12
4
0–3

Life Verdicts
18

14
2
19
1

Death Verdicts

Hung Jury

0
2
17

0
1
0

The data is again striking in that in every one of the fourteen cases
where five or more jurors affirmatively voted for life, a life sentence
resulted. And as expected, given that nine votes for death almost
guaranteed a death sentence, where three or fewer votes were cast for
life on the initial ballot, the result was death in seventeen of the eighteen
cases (in the one case in this category that resulted in a life sentence,
there had been three votes for life but only eight votes for death, as one
juror had voted “undecided”). In the “on the fence” cases where four
affirmative votes for life were cast on the first ballot, two juries came
back death, two juries returned life sentences, and one jury hung; this
result roughly mirrors the earlier finding that once the vote tally for
death dropped from nine to eight votes, the likelihood of a death
sentence dropped to 60%.
As the data demonstrates, therefore, a first-vote threshold exists
that almost always results in either a death or life sentence. The threshold
for ensuring a life sentence (five votes), however, is significantly lower

16. Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 303.
17. Because Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells did not provide a separate breakdown based on
number of votes for life, see supra note 8, it is not possible to combine the South Carolina and
California totals. Given the similarity in death sentence rates based on votes for death, though, the
rates based on life votes would likely be very similar.
18. One of these cases was unanimous for life.
19. In this case, there had been three votes for life, but only eight votes for death, as one juror
voted “undecided.”
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than for a death sentence (nine votes), and a life sentence remains a
distinct possibility even when as few as four jurors favor life on the first
ballot. The reasons for this lower threshold in life cases will be explored
later, but the basic lesson is clear: It is possible in life cases for a
relatively small group of jurors favoring life to swing a jury all the way
20
over to a unanimous life sentence. By contrast, it is almost impossible
for jurors favoring death to obtain a death sentence unless they
command at least two-thirds of the jury’s vote for death on the first
21
ballot. Thus, while the data lends little credence to Hollywood’s heroic
view of a lone holdout turning around entire juries, in life cases a
minority group of jurors frequently were able to turn around majority
sentiment so long as they reach a critical threshold of four or more votes.
Or to put it another way, it generally takes at least four Henry Fonda
characters, and not just one, to have a real-life jury of “Twelve Angry
22
Men.”
The role that the difference in threshold votes between life and
death juries plays in the deliberation process can be seen in several other
areas of comparison as well. On average, for instance, life cases required
five ballots to reach unanimity, while juries in death cases took only
three ballots. This difference would be expected given that life cases
sometimes had as many as eight jurors who had to be persuaded to
change their votes, while death cases normally had at most three jurors
who needed to be convinced to crossover. Indeed within the pool of life
cases, considerable variation existed depending on the initial ballot: Life
juries that necessitated a majority of jurors to cross over from initially
23
favoring death averaged seven ballots, while life juries that began with a
majority in favor of life averaged only four votes. This greater likelihood
of volatility in vote changes among life juries also might help explain why

20. In two life cases, the vote for a death sentence during deliberations exceeded eight votes at
certain points, peaking as high as nine-to-three for death in one case and ten-to-two in the other. In
both cases, however, the core life jurors’ refusal to budge eventually swung the jury to a life sentence.
Importantly, in each of these cases the initial vote for death was less than nine votes (the threshold
which almost always guarantees a death sentence), suggesting that some of the votes for death on later
ballots and in the middle of deliberations were “soft.”
21. Thus, while overall about 90% of the penalty verdicts followed the majority vote on the first
ballot, an important distinction exists between death and life juries: A majority vote for death still
resulted in a death sentence in 79% of the cases, but a majority vote for life on the first ballot resulted
in a life sentence every time (100%). This result is almost identical to what Eisenberg, Garvey and
Wells found in South Carolina. Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 303–04 (reporting 72% of the cases
where the majority on the first ballot voted death resulted in death sentences, and 100% of the cases
where the majority on the first ballot voted for life resulted in life sentences).
22. Twelve Angry Men (Orion-Nova Productions 1957). As Professors Eisenberg, Garvey, and
Wells have aptly described the phenomenon, “death verdicts are . . . relatively more difficult to
orchestrate [than life verdicts].” Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 304.
23. One jury with an initial majority for death held twelve ballots before reaching unanimity for
life.
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jurors who served on life juries were on average much less likely than
24
those on death juries to see their jury as having been “like-minded.”
Despite these differences, however, death and life juries did share
one important trait in their deliberations. As Chart 3 below shows, both
were likely to have at least one juror who was “especially reluctant” to
change his or her vote to reach unanimity.
Chart 3
Question: “Were Any Jurors [on Your Jury] Especially Reluctant
To Go Along with the Majority on the Defendant’s Punishment?”
Death Jurors
Life Jurors
Yes
66%
69%
No
34%
31%
Consequently, even though a death jury, on average, may have had
fewer jurors to persuade to reach a unanimous verdict, the odds were
25
high that at least one juror had strongly resisted joining the majority.
Likewise, even life juries that started off with a substantial majority for
life often reported that at least one juror tenaciously insisted on a death
sentence. And, naturally, life juries that began with a majority favoring
death were especially likely to have one or more jurors vociferously
objecting as they watched the jury’s center of gravity shift dramatically
from supporting their view of favoring death to returning a verdict of life.
How juries eventually struggled to unanimity is the topic to which the
Article now turns.

II. Setting the Stage and Processing the Evidence:
“We Had Charts Galore”
In almost every case (95%), the jury did not take a vote upon first
entering the jury room after hearing the judge’s instructions, but made an
initial effort to sort through the evidence that they had heard during the
penalty phase. For some juries, the delay in taking a vote was the result
24. Jurors were asked whether, “In your mind, [was the jury] like-minded, saw things the same
way?” The breakdown between death and life jurors in their answers showed life jurors less likely to
see their jury as like-minded:
Death Jurors
Life Jurors
Very Well
15%
3%
Fairly Well
61%
58%
Not so well/Not at all
24%
38%
25. That individual jurors differ from their jury’s verdict apparently is not an uncommon
occurrence. A recent study of non-capital cases found that even by conservative calculations, about
40% of the juries studied had jurors who were “dissenters,” in other words, jurors who would have
come up with a different verdict than their jury “if it were entirely up to [the juror] as a one-person
jury.” Nicole L. Waters & Valerie P. Hans, A Jury of One: Opinion Formation, Conformity, and
Dissent on Juries, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 513, 523–24 (2009).
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of having learned at the guilt-innocence phase that voting immediately
26
upon sitting down had a tendency to make deliberations more difficult.
As a juror from such a case noted:
We didn’t take a vote right away, because we had found out from the
[guilt-innocence] phase of the trial that people tend to stick to your
first vote. If you go in and say “guilty” or “not guilty” and you make it
public knowledge, it’s very hard for people to change their mind, very
hard, so we chose not to do this the second time.

In one of the few cases where a vote at the penalty phase was taken
immediately, the foreperson had intended only to take a “straw vote” to
get a feel for where the jury stood, but ended up quite surprised:
I said, “[B]efore we start, let’s take a vote,” so we passed out slips. I
opened up them up and they were all the same—“death.” We sat there
and looked at each other just a little bit. I was feeling a little guilty
because that took us about five minutes. I thought maybe we should
discuss it a little bit.

A juror on this same panel, even though strongly for death, also was
taken aback and tried to jump-start the deliberations out of a sense of
fairness:
The deliberation would have taken half-an-hour, except I kept it going
just to bring up questions. Everyone had automatically decided,
“bingo, this was death.” There wasn’t anyone who had any doubts. I
can’t say I had any doubts, but what I said [was] we have to list all
major points the defense has put out, then say whether we agree or
disagree with them. So there were a couple of points: that he was
brought up in a really bad environment; he had gone there without
premeditation, it just happened; he didn’t know what he was doing at
the time he did it. I didn’t think any of those were true, but I thought
we should talk them through, so we talked them through. So it was not
[a] long deliberation. I was struck how eleven other people were all
willing to say, “okay that’s it.” I mean we’re putting a guy to death. I
didn’t have an argument with people’s opinion of what should happen,
but that they would be so quick [to decide].

Unable to spark any dissenting views, the jury voted again, this time
verbally, and not surprisingly, the vote was still unanimous for death.
Another juror on this jury recalled that when they called the bailiff to say
that they had reached a verdict, “the bailiff just looked at all of us” in
astonishment, and the judge appeared “totally shocked” at how quickly
the sentence had been reached.
Most juries, however, found themselves far from united on the
proper verdict as they sat down to discuss the evidence. Although a
number of jurors by then had started to form leanings towards a death
27
(36%) or a life sentence (24%), a significant portion of the jurors (40%)

26. Cf. id. at 531 (finding that early voting in deliberations and secret ballots were more likely to
produce “dissenters” who did not personally agree with the jury’s final verdict).
27. For an examination of jurors entering the penalty phase based on impressions formed at the
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reported that they entered deliberations at the penalty phase still
28
undecided over the appropriate punishment. At this juncture the jury
had jury instructions to weigh the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and to conclude whether a death or life sentence was
29
justified, instructions that the jurors tended to characterize broadly as

guilt-innocence phases, see William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing:
Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 Cornell L. Rev.
1476 (1998).
28. See Waters & Hans, supra note 25, at 525–26 (finding in the non-capital context that jurors
often change their minds during deliberations).
29. The California jury instruction on how to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances has
changed over time in how it communicates the weighing process to the jury. The original instruction
read: “If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you
shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state
prison for life without the possibility of parole.” See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 374 (1990). In
Boyde, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this instruction against a federal constitutional challenge,
concluding that the instruction’s language adequately allowed consideration of mitigating
circumstances and thus, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on mandatory death sentences.
Id. at 374–76.
The California Supreme Court, however, found the instruction potentially misleading as to
the weighing process, which led to a different instruction that elaborated on the process:
It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the
state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed on defendant. After
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account
and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon
which you have been instructed. The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or
the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral
or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are
permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you simply determine under
the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality
of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return
a judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so
substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of
life without parole.
People v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 143–44 (Cal. 1991) (explaining jury instruction as product of People v.
Brown, 726 P.2d 516, 531–32 (Cal. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987)). The current
jury instruction essentially reinstates the Brown instruction, but makes it clear that the jury is not
barred from returning a life sentence even if it does not find mitigating circumstances:
You have sole responsibility to decide which penalty (the/each) defendant will receive.
....
. . . Each of you is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you find
appropriate to each individual factor and to all of them together. Do not simply count the
number of aggravating and mitigating factors and decide based on the higher number alone.
Consider the relative or combined weight of the factors and evaluate them in terms of their
relative convincing force on the question of punishment.
Each of you must decide for yourself whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist.
You do not all need to agree whether such factors exist. . . .
Determine which penalty is appropriate and justified by considering all the evidence and
the totality of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Even without mitigating
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asking them to identify the “good” and the “bad” evidence about the
defendant and then to balance the two categories of evidence against
each other.
Faced with such a daunting factual and moral decision, almost every
jury turned to making charts in an initial effort to gain a handle on the
question before them. One juror described how when her jury had first
entered the jury room, the atmosphere was “pretty stressful and pretty
argumentative; people were venting.” At this point, another juror called
upon his management training—a relatively common occurrence—and
suggested “story boarding . . . we divided up the pros and cons on the
chalkboard, we just let everybody speak their mind and we put things on
the board, ideas. We would study them and decide which were really
important and narrowed it down from there.” Nor was this juror’s
description unusual, as almost every jury room ended up with charts up
on the wall; one juror’s description of his jury room was typical: “I don’t
know if every jury group does this, but we took sheets and plastered
[charts] all over the board, all over the walls.”
In undertaking this enterprise, juries tended to use two different
types of charts, and some used both. One type of chart, the listing chart,
attempted to categorize the evidence into lists of what was “aggravating”
and what was “mitigating” (although jurors reported that they most
commonly used the headings of “death” and “life” rather than the legal
terms). Juries sometimes became quite elaborate in their effort to sort
through the evidence and quantify its importance; one jury, for example,
“gave each item a 1 to 10. Each juror voted on each circumstance; it was
very methodical.” The result was a chart that both identified factors and
attempted to quantify their importance.
Although listing factors might sound like a relatively easy exercise
to start off the deliberations, a number of juries discovered that even this
process sparked disagreements that foreshadowed more intensive
debates ahead. A common area of dispute was whether a particular
factor was properly listed as an aggravating or mitigating factor. This
type of dispute often centered on the defendant’s use of drugs or alcohol
during the crime, with jurors split over whether a self-induced altered
30
state of mind could be mitigating. Similarly, jurors often disagreed over

circumstances, you may decide that the aggravating circumstances are not substantial
enough to warrant death. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded
that the aggravating circumstances both outweigh the mitigating circumstances and are also
so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that a sentence of death is
appropriate and justified.
1 Judicial Council of Cal., Criminal Jury Instructions § 766 (2008).
30. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?,
98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1556–59 (1998) (finding that jurors differ over whether certain types of
mitigating evidence is aggravating or mitigating).
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how to categorize prior periods in the defendant’s life where he had
shown himself capable of acting lawfully. Some jurors saw this as
aggravating because they believed it showed that the defendant had the
free will to choose a life of crime, while others saw the evidence as
mitigating because it showed that the defendant was not incorrigibly
31
evil.
The other type of chart that juries often made was in the form of a
chronology of the defendant’s life. As one juror described the process,
“we wound up . . . like how in elementary school you would do a time
line.” The time line was an effort by the jury to answer the question that,
for many jurors, was the key to analyzing the defendant’s case for life:
Did the defendant at some point in his life have an opportunity to take
the “high road,” or did the circumstances of his life deprive him of that
32
choice? If the defendant’s mitigating circumstances convinced the jury
that the defendant never really had a chance to choose the high road, the
33
chances of a life sentence increased greatly. On the other hand, if the
jury believed that the defendant, even if he had suffered great hardship
or trauma, had been given an opportunity to escape the negative
influences at some juncture, then they were much more likely to
conclude that he had made the choice to continue down the “low road”
and would vote for death. In making this assessment, most capital jurors
used a perspective that strongly emphasized individual self-determination
and free will. As a result, even powerful mitigating evidence of child
abuse or mental illness—evidence that all the jurors agreed was true and
emotionally compelling—risked being discounted if the defendant had
also had a period of time in a loving home or received treatment for his
34
illness.
With this overarching question in mind, juries consistently plotted
out the defendant’s time line on a chalk board or on long sheets of paper
(what might be called the “butcher block paper” phenomenon) as part of
their effort to determine whether the defendant had been propelled
toward committing the capital crime by forces beyond his control. The
following quotes, each from a different case, give a sense of how juries

31. See id.
32. See Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 26,
56–59 (2000) (discussing jurors’ responses to different types of mitigation evidence). See generally
Michelle E. Barnett et al., When Mitigation Evidence Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological
Mitigating Evidence on Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 Behav. Sci. & L. 751 (2004) (using
vignettes to explore the impact of different types of mitigation); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic:
An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1109
(1997) (examining how jurors respond to different themes of mitigation).
33. See Sundby, supra note 32, at 1136–39.
34. Id. at 1135–36 (noting how jurors’ belief in “free will” can trump even powerful mitigating
evidence).
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would use this technique in trying to puzzle over the defendant’s life
story:
We really recreated his life. We drew a time line up about what his
psyche was like at different points of his life. We wanted to get a
handle, a sense of how this person got to be what he was, because we
heard a lot of evidence and a lot of letters, dates, and we wanted to get
a sense of when things took place. And so we talked about the various
things in his life—the mitigating, of course, dominated the early parts,
because that was the abuse and things. And then as we worked our way
through his life we found we got more into the aggravating. There was
a fair amount of discussion about whether he had the ability [to change
his life] after he committed his first crime and he went to prison and
allegedly got some kind of counseling. You know, some people felt he
had a chance to turn around and chose not to.
***
The primary thing we had to go over was his youth, his background, his
prison record, his life in the youth authority system. Did he have
available psychiatric help? Did they have clergy help? And we went
into great length on the abuse of him as a child. We had a big billboard,
sheets of paper about half the size of this table, and we went up there
and listed all the things that we could possibly list on his behalf, and
then we came and listed all the things that were definitely proven
against the man. We put these all in sequence, and we took hours to do
this—a day and a half I guess.
***
We had a chalkboard and we put all the events on the board. Then we
went about debating each phase of his life, and you could see people
strongly moved and defending him because of his abuse, and you could
see people coming back to the viciousness or heinousness of the crime.
And you could see where it was going—and we talked about each
incarceration, each strong armed robbery, each part of the abuse again.
We broke it up into segments and put it up on the board and debated
and discussed each section and debated whether, you know, where the
flaws were. That lasted for a couple of days, three days or so, and then
we took a vote.
***
It’s pretty dramatic. I mean the whole experience is very story like.
There was a story that unfolded, and it’s incredibly vivid, the facts of
his childhood. We put it into chronology because everything came at us
in bits and pieces, and part of the puzzle was trying to put it into some
sort of order. There were very few unanswered questions. It’s very
surprising how only hearing a story, like radio, is so much more vivid
than seeing something. You become, at least I do, become much more
involved as the evidence unfolded.
***

Only once the evidence was placed on the charts and discussed did a
jury generally take their first vote. As seen earlier, this initial vote tended
to be strongly predictive of the final penalty verdict based on the
different thresholds for a death and life sentence. But, as also noted,
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most juries were unlikely to find themselves unanimous at the outset and
more deliberations were required before the jury reached a verdict.
While those deliberations would focus on the facts of the individual case,
in the background were two major concerns that affected almost every
juror’s vote and decisionmaking.

III. The Two Elephants in the Jury Room: The Meaning of Life
Without Parole and the Fear of a Hung Jury
Having just convicted the defendant of murder, the first concern
among jurors is unsurprising and essentially constitutes the capital juror’s
Hippocratic oath: ensuring that, above all else, the defendant will never
kill again. Jurors consistently expressed the view—even those who were
strongly moved by the defendant’s case for life—that they would vote for
a death sentence if they were not assured that the defendant would be
35
safely locked away.
With this concern in mind, the meaning of “life without parole”
often played a critical role in shaping a juror’s vote and the jury’s
36
deliberations. As a number of studies have found, jurors often are
highly skeptical about the meaning of “life without parole,” and one of
the most common questions asked during the penalty deliberations is an
inquiry attempting to clarify whether “life without parole” guarantees
37
the defendant will never be released. Juries tended to ask this question
once they had become deadlocked and an uneasy détente existed in the
jury room. Jurors favoring life would have acknowledged that they would
of course vote for death if they thought the defendant would ever get out
of jail; the jurors favoring death would have agreed that arguments
existed for a life sentence, but would have maintained that a life sentence
could not guarantee the defendant would not be back on the streets.
With the deliberations stalemated, the jury would send out their inquiry
to the judge. In fact, several juries sent their question to the judge about
the meaning of life without parole at the same time that they asked what
would happen if they were deadlocked.

35. See Sundby, supra note 32, at 1165–67 (describing a case where some jurors’ concern that
defendant’s mental illness would make him dangerous in the future overrode the mitigating evidence
that he was a paranoid schizophrenic); see also John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Scott E.
Sundby, Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell
Us About Mitigation, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 1035, 1047–49 (2008) [hereinafter Blume et al., Competent
Capital Representation]. See generally John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases:
Always “At Issue,” 86 Cornell L. Rev. 397 (1998).
36. See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By Default: An Empirical
Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 605 (1998)
(discussing CJP findings on jurors’ skepticism about life without parole, and summarizing other
studies).
37. Scott E. Sundby, A Life and Death Decision: A Jury Weighs the Death Penalty 36–39
(2005).
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Where the judge’s response triggered a return of a life verdict, it
usually was because the judge’s response was understood as an assurance
that the defendant would never be released. This assurance took away
the main argument of the jurors favoring death, and a life sentence was
usually forthcoming, and often fairly quickly.
On the other hand, jurors arguing for a life sentence were
undermined if the jury thought that the judge was in any way indicating
that a life sentence was not fail-safe. One juror’s description of her jury’s
decision vividly illustrates how skepticism about the meaning of life
without parole can act as the fulcrum in swinging the jury to death or life:
We were not in total agreement that he should have death but we were
in total agreement that he should not be back in society, and if we
could have given a verdict that would not have been overturned in
some future day, that would have kept him in prison forever, then I
believe the jury would not have given the death penalty.

With the defendant’s possible release having become this jury
deliberation’s focal point, the jury asked the judge whether the
defendant might ever be released, and “[the judge] for some reason
could not answer the question and he told us that.” With the judge
unable to allay the jury’s fears, the juror noted, “[W]e didn’t deliberate
very long at all,” because even those jurors who had been holding out for
life had to agree that “God knows what would have happened, you
know, Charles Manson would be out again, or anybody could be out
again . . . . Given that option, we had to give him death.” This juror
concluded by suggesting that if the jury could have imposed “many life
sentences” they would have felt sufficiently reassured and not have
imposed a death sentence, a suggestion that poignantly reflects many
jurors’ perception that only a verdict stretching toward eternity could
safely ensure that the defendant will be incarcerated forever because the
38
criminal justice system is too lenient.
The second constant concern of jurors may be more surprising.
Jurors almost uniformly saw a hung jury as not only an undesirable
result, but as a failure. This was in part because of pragmatic concerns
such as the expense of a new trial (“[I]t was like ‘oh God,’ another trial
‘costing the taxpayers.’”) and the desire to avoid making another jury
undergo the same ordeal (“[T]he thought of a new trial was a horrible
thought.”). More fundamentally, though, the aversion to not reaching a
final verdict stemmed from sitting on a trial for weeks or months and
feeling that they would have “seriously failed” in their duty if they had
39
hung after all of that time. Jurors, therefore, tended to see reaching a

38. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 36.
39. The length of the trial, however, does not appear to be a determinative factor. Professor
Sandys uncovered a similar concern over becoming a hung jury with jurors in Kentucky cases, where
trials generally lasted a much shorter time. Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs—Capital Jurors Who Change
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unanimous verdict as a key measure of their jury’s success, and they
often said that they felt individual responsibility to drive their jury to
reach a verdict.
The jurors’ natural aversion to becoming a hung jury was often
heightened if they alerted the judge that they had become stalemated.
The judge usually responded by instructing them on the need to try and
40
reach a unanimous verdict, and the message was not lost on the jurors
that the judge did not want a hung jury. As one juror paraphrased the
judge’s response, “The judge said, ‘[Y]ou’ll be here until the cows come
home.’” This message was strengthened by the fact that many jurors felt
that the jury itself was in some sense on trial and would be judged by
whether they had reached a verdict; because jurors generally liked their
judge and cared about the judge’s—and to a lesser extent the lawyers’—
assessment of the jurors, the felt need to reach unanimity was a powerful
dynamic in the jury room and for individual jurors.

IV. The Persuasion of Life Holdouts to Reach a Unanimous
Verdict of Death
With the twin concerns over the meaning of life without parole and
being a hung jury in the background, the question in the push to
unanimity became how those jurors who were resisting the majority’s
desired sentence could be persuaded to change their minds. It was at this
point that juries demonstrated a remarkable consistency in the process
through which they ultimately reached a unanimous verdict. For cases
where the majority jurors were trying to persuade a juror holding out for
life to change his or her vote to death, the process began with the
forming of a united front among those jurors favoring death.
A. Step One: Forming a United Front
Psychologists have discovered that when groups deliberate and an
initial disagreement exists, group members tend not to move toward a
“middle” position, but actually become even more extreme in the

Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 Ind. L.J. 1183, 1199
(1995).
40. A judge’s instruction to continue deliberations is sometimes referred to as a “dynamite
charge,” or Allen charge, named after the Supreme Court case Allen v. United States, that approved of
a jury instruction encouraging minority jurors to reconsider their views in light of the views of the
majority. 164 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1896). The California Supreme Court has disapproved of the Allen
charge generally because of its potential coerciveness, see People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1000 (Cal.
1997), but judges are allowed to give supplemental instructions encouraging the jury to deliberate
further in a manner that ensures they consider the views of other jurors. See People v. Moore, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 715, 724–26 (Ct. App. 2002). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Allen charges do not
constitute constitutional error at the penalty phase of capital cases. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231, 237–41 (1988).
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41

direction of their original leanings. Psychologists attribute this tendency
to two factors: First, the more discussion that occurs in favor of a
particular view, the greater the number of reasons that are generated to
support group members favoring that position; and, second, as some
people discover that others in the group share their perspective, they will
become more extreme in their views as a way to establish their
42
individuality within the group.
With death juries in particular, the effects of group polarization
43
could be seen at work. This was in part because, as noted earlier, a
death jury almost always had at least eight votes for death on the first
ballot; as a result, the arguments for a death sentence dominated the
jury’s discussion by virtue of numbers alone. Moreover, the convictions
of those favoring death—even those who at first were only tepid in
wanting a death sentence—tended to strengthen as discussion after the
first vote continued, until many expressed the view that a death sentence
was the only correct outcome.
That most jurors favoring death at this point were convinced that a
death sentence was the only justifiable legal and moral outcome is critical
to understanding the dynamics in the jury room where a death sentence
emerged. From these jurors’ perspective, the legal and moral equations
yielded only one logical answer. To disagree with that answer, therefore,
was the same as hearing someone trying to argue against an obvious
truth. One juror captured this sentiment when he complained that the
holdout in his case “was just one juror who was basing his ideas like
somebody that says, ‘H2O isn’t water and 5 times 5 isn’t 25.’”
This certainty may seem contradictory to the law governing the
death penalty. The Supreme Court has held that a mandatory death
penalty is unconstitutional, and jury instructions are to make clear that
the jury is not required to return a death sentence but has the option of a

41. Psychologists call the phenomenon “group polarization,” which can be slightly misleading,
because the tendency is not to split groups into two poles, but for individuals to move more strongly in
the direction of their initial tendencies. Philip G. Zimbardo & Michael R. Leippe, The Psychology of
Attitude Change and Social Influence 320–22 (1991). A number of wonderful experiments have
illustrated this phenomenon of group polarization. In one classic experiment, researchers found that
following a group discussion, French students who held only a mild dislike for Americans at the outset
were far more critical of Americans after the discussion. See Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The
Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 125, 125–35 (1969). Another
experiment convened a group of women with moderate pro-feminist leanings and found that they held
much stronger pro-feminist views following their discussion of feminist issues. See David G. Myers,
Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 Hum. Rel. 699, 708–12 (1975). Experiments have
confirmed this tendency of group discussion to push members towards a more extreme view of their
original leanings in a number of areas. See, e.g., Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second
Edition 200–48 (1986) (summarizing experiments involving attitudes on race relations).
42. Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 41, at 321.
43. See supra Part I.
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44

life sentence. And while some jurors may misunderstand the
instructions as requiring a death sentence if they find an aggravating
45
factor, for many jurors the certainty lay in the idea that even though a
death penalty was not automatically required, the facts of their case
allowed only one possible verdict—that of a death sentence. Though
difficult to generalize, jurors voicing this view have often described their
decision to vote for the death penalty as based on the idea that the
defendant’s murder of the victim so upset the moral balance that the only
46
way to right the moral balance was for the defendant to forfeit his life.
Each juror’s sense of what constituted the proper moral balance was
complicated and colored by a multitude of factors, such as the juror’s
worldview, the victim’s actions, the defendant’s perceived remorse, and
47
even the trial strategy. For those jurors strongly in favor of death,
however, the balance seemed so clear in their case that, even if
discretionary, they believed that any person who balanced aggravating
and mitigating factors would have to agree that under the law, a death
sentence was the proper result.
The conviction that death was the only justifiable sentence affected
the jury’s deliberations in several ways. First, the certainty worked to
shore up support for a death sentence among those jurors who were not
initially strong in their opinion either for death or for life. Thus, while a
death sentence requires a threshold of at least eight votes for death,
some of the votes for death might be “soft” and still subject to
persuasion. These “swing voters,” consistent with the polarization
phenomenon, frequently stated that they became more sure in their
support of a death sentence in part because the other jurors were so
certain that a death sentence was correct. One juror, who actually voted
for life on the first ballot, typified this reaction in explaining that she
changed her vote to death because, “Well, I guess in a way it was the
strong feelings [of the other jurors]. I knew I didn’t have to
change . . . , but I looked at the awful, terrible things he had done and I
couldn’t argue with what he had done in the past.”
In addition to this tendency to move “soft” jurors more strongly
towards death, the strengthening conviction among majority jurors that a
death sentence was the only acceptable punishment also affected how the
holdouts for life were perceived. Because these holdouts for life were

44. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1993) (finding about 30% of jurors believed that they were
required to impose a death sentence if they found the defendant posed a future danger).
46. See Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining
Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1929, 1959–61 (2006).
47. See generally Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation, supra note 35 (discussing
mitigating evidence in capital cases).
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seen by the jurors favoring death as having made a “mistake” (as not
understanding that two plus two equals four), the question for the
majority jurors as deliberations dragged on became why the holdouts
were refusing to acknowledge their mistake. Majority jurors favoring
death consistently arrived at several common explanations for the life
holdouts’ perceived intransigence.
Often majority jurors stated that the holdouts actually understood
that a death sentence was the correct decision demanded by the law, but
the difficulty was that they lacked the fortitude to vote for what, deep
down, they knew was the right decision. From this perspective, therefore,
the majority jurors’ task was to assist the holdouts in overcoming their
fears, a perspective reflected by the following comments from jurors in
different cases:
The weak ones had doubts not because of the evidence but because of
their fears—the stronger ones helped them out and they were
okay . . . The majority gave the reluctant jurors the strength they
needed, because they couldn’t have done it otherwise.
***
Two or three of the jurors couldn’t come to grips with the decision that
we all as a group worked through . . . . I knew what they had decided,
[that death was the proper verdict,] but obviously they couldn’t bring
themselves to that decision, and they needed time to think about it.
***
People felt [John] deserved the death penalty, but it’s a tough decision,
and some needed to have their hands held.
***
The couple of jurors who were not sure [about death] at the first vote
really were sure, they just felt that they should take more time and
consider the evidence before committing to anything.

A number of majority jurors favoring death thus came to feel that it was
their duty to give the holdouts the “strength” to arrive at what the
holdouts in fact knew was the right conclusion.
From the majority’s vantage point, this perceived inability to do
what the law required—impose a death sentence—was usually attributed
to the holdouts as having become too emotional in their approach to the
decision once confronted with the enormity of sentencing someone to
48
death. Typical comments characterized the holdouts as “ha[ving] to
search their souls,” or as someone who “was intelligent, but . . . became
emotional when making certain decisions.” By being too emotional, the
holdout was also likely, from the majority’s standpoint, to be too
susceptible to the defendant’s arguments (“[T]here were two jurors who

48. For example, as one juror summarized, “I guess they felt they were mortals and shouldn’t do
it.”
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were very impressed with the bleeding heart aspect of the defendant’s
final argument.”). The majority also sometimes speculated that the
49
holdouts’ hesitancy might be due to unstated religious reasons.
In a similar vein, it also was commonplace for the majority jurors to
see the life holdouts as demonstrating a naiveté about the realities of life
and the defendant’s actions. One juror’s characterization of the holdout
as “a sweet lady, looking for the good in people” carried a poignant
undercurrent of sadness that the real world did not match the holdout’s
rose-colored view. A juror in another case said he had tired of the
holdouts’ “baloney . . . [of] starting to feel sorry for him—well, he hadn’t
had this, and he hadn’t had that,” and he concluded that “some people
didn’t understand” the reality that “you’ve got an individual here, that’s
twenty-one years old, running around shooting people!” Another juror
similarly thought that the lone holdout on his jury “felt that the past
really didn’t happen, that the defendant would be good; it took a few
days for him to finally put it together that the same guy did the
aggravating things as had the mitigating factors.”
As would be expected, the harshest assessments were reserved for
life jurors who did not quickly come around to the majority view.
Majority jurors knew that at voir dire the holdout would have had to
respond to the Witherspoon questions that he or she could impose a
death sentence; otherwise the juror would not have been allowed to
50
serve on a capital jury. Majority jurors, however, usually became
convinced that jurors who held out for more than a few ballots were,
when push came to shove, actually against the death penalty. Usually this
was explained as the holdouts having a blind spot that made them unable
to honestly acknowledge their opposition. Thus, jurors favoring death
would make comments like:
[The holdout] never admitted it, but it became very clear, we felt later
that he clearly did not believe in the death penalty. A lot of us have
things where we just cannot be honest about them, [and] I think that

49. Some life jurors did attribute their position in part to their religious beliefs, as did some death
jurors. See Sundby, supra note 37, at 73–74; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, The
Merciful Capital Juror, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 165, 190 (2004) (finding that “high mercy” jurors were
more likely to be regular church attendees).
50. Under Supreme Court doctrine, a juror can be excluded for cause from serving on a capital
jury if his or her views would “substantially impair” their ability to follow the law. See Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). This process, known as death qualification, revolves around asking the
juror about his or her beliefs on the death penalty. Id. at 439. These questions are commonly referred
to as the “Witherspoon questions,” derived from the Supreme Court case Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 513–15 (1968). The effects of death qualification on the racial, gender, and attitudinal
composition of capital juries has been the subject of considerable legal and psychological criticism. See
generally, Bruce J. Winnick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 785, 849–50 n.443 (collecting various studies and
critiques of the death qualification process).
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was one of his things he wouldn’t cop to, but he definitely was against
the death penalty.

Nor were the majority jurors necessarily unsympathetic toward what
they viewed as the holdout’s perceived change of heart when the reality
of actually having to impose a death sentence loomed:
You know it’s all good and okay to say you believe in the death
penalty, but when you look at somebody across the room and know
that you’re giving him the death penalty, I’d like to tell you, you can
very well think, “[W]ell, maybe I don’t believe in it.” I think that’s
really the decision [the holdout] came to—I really think she changed
her mind.

Less frequently, jurors thought that the life holdouts had knowingly lied
to get on the jury:
I think some people—and I don’t want to be openly harsh to them, I’m
telling this on tape—I think they answered some of the questions at the
jury selection not quite as accurately as they should have. As I
understand the process of jury selection, they had to answer “yes” that
they could impose the death penalty, and something tells me that
[they] answered the question dishonestly. By the way, I think the
defense counsel did a terrific job of putting people like that on the jury.
That’s his job, I’m not being critical, that’s his job, but it was a very
disappointing part of being a juror.

If the holdout proved especially intransigent, majority jurors
sometimes engaged in a bit of amateur psychoanalysis and concluded
that a holdout “had problems.” When engaged in such psychoanalysis,
majority jurors usually saw the holdout as having become too
emotionally fixated on the defendant for various reasons:
She had this unnatural attachment to him or something. I think that
she mothered him in some way. Do you know what I’m saying? Like
she had some type of maternal need to protect him. She kept saying
that he wasn’t a bad person—yes, he shot the guy five times after he
pleaded for his life—but he’s really a nice guy. It had more to do with
him than anything she believed [about] capital punishment.
***
It was an older gentleman and basically what he felt at the last minute
was he had this kind of feeling that it could have been his son. His son
was basically the same age and he just started identifying with [the
defendant] a little bit.
***
[The holdout said he] didn’t want to take a father away from his
daughter—he was projecting his own feelings on the daughter.

Some exasperated jurors simply would summarize the holdouts’ motives
as unfathomable, with observations such as: “[The holdout] was
psychotic;” “[The holdout] was bizarre, unstable—she cracked at
sentencing;” “She had definite problems;” “She was just a crazy lady,
most of us agreed.” One juror ventured the theory that a pregnant

Sundby_62-HLJ-103.doc (Do Not Delete)

November 2010]

1/7/2011 12:10 PM

WAR & PEACE IN THE JURY ROOM

125

holdout’s “craz[iness]” and her reluctance to vote for death was because
“she was growing life.”
Thus, in understanding how juries that returned death sentences
reached unanimity, it is critical to realize that, in a room dominated by
jurors arguing for death (remember that almost always at least eight
jurors will have voted for death), many of the members of the majority
will come to believe that the law in their case leads to one possible
outcome: a death sentence. This strong belief, reinforced by a
supermajority of jurors voicing in roundtable fashion that “the law”
requires death—that that two plus two in fact equals four, not five—in
turn tends to encourage a view of those jurors arguing for life as
individuals who are letting emotion cloud their rational judgment.
B. Step Two: The “Education” and Isolation of the Holdouts
With the majority having formed a strong united front in favor of
death, motivated by a perception that the jurors favoring life were letting
emotion cloud their judgment, the stage was set for the majority to push
towards unanimity. The manner in which life holdouts were persuaded to
change their votes was remarkably consistent from jury to jury in terms
of the themes of the arguments advanced for death, as well as the
eventual reactions of the holdouts. By this point in the deliberations, a
strong and vocal majority would have repeated the arguments for death
over and over. They would have stressed that the defendant was an
explosively dangerous person, who either would kill again in jail or,
worse yet, find a way out of prison. They would have discredited the
defendant’s mitigating evidence as not explaining the horrific murder
(“just because somebody had an unhappy childhood doesn’t mean they
have to go for a life of crime”) and would have declared that the
defendant had chosen to take the low road (“[H]e’d been given
opportunities in life, but never, . . . , took advantage of them.”).
In pushing for unanimity, majority jurors often began by arguing to
the life holdouts that they needed to separate their own personal feelings
from their duties as jurors. Majority jurors were able to make this
argument sincerely, as they generally did perceive the legal process as
responsible for the defendant’s death sentence, rather than themselves as
individuals. When asked about whether they felt personally responsible
for sending someone to death, jurors frequently responded along the
lines of, “the law hung him, not us,” or, “I didn’t feel that I was killing
someone.” In a similar vein, jurors sometimes would cast the decision as
one that the defendant himself had essentially made: “It was his decision
to shoot the guy, not mine.” Not surprisingly, when asked to rank who
was “most responsible for the defendant’s punishment,” jurors
consistently chose by a significant margin “the defendant because his
conduct is what actually determined the punishment” (50%), or “the
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law” (26%), distantly followed by “the jury” (9%), “the individual juror”
51
(9%), and “the judge” (5%).
These types of responses might at first seem counterintuitive
because the law makes very clear that each juror must individually
52
decide whether the death penalty is warranted. Moreover, it is hard to
imagine a more subjective decisionmaking process than being asked to
“weigh” aggravating factors such as the vileness of the crime against
mitigating circumstances like child abuse. What became apparent is that
many jurors coped with the immensity of the death-penalty decision by
embracing the idea that they were playing a role in a larger scheme and
were carrying out a duty that society and the legal system had placed
upon them: “[W]e comforted each other by saying, ‘this was the law and
this is what he had done, and he’s done it to himself.’” Jurors regularly
spoke of having “a job to do,” or in terms of having carried out an
arduous civic duty. One juror analogized sitting as a capital juror to
“rescuing people from a burning house—you may not want to go in and
rescue someone, but you force yourself to do it.” And a significant part
of how these jurors perceived their role was, as one juror described it,
“[not] interject[ing] my personal thoughts when I was representing the
law—set[ting] aside your own personal feelings is what I was trying to
do.” Or, as a juror in another case explained, she had tried to be “the
53
perfect juror” by avoiding emotion and being as “objective” as possible.
Not surprisingly, therefore, majority jurors often saw defusing the
life jurors’ concerns over being personally responsible for the death of
51. Not all jurors, of course, separated themselves from the decision. A few openly embraced it,
like the juror who stated: “I felt that my vote ought to count, [and] I would’ve taken a gun and gone
down and popped him right down there in the [courthouse] basement.”
52. Some have suggested that jurors’ inclination not to identify themselves as the actor primarily
responsible for the death sentence may show that jurors do not fully understand that the law requires
the juror to make a personal determination of the proper punishment. See Joseph L. Hoffmann,
Where’s the Buck?—Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 Ind.
L.J. 1137, 1155–60 (1995); see also Bowers, supra note 3, at 1093–98. Others have concluded, after
examining other indicators of jurors’ sense of responsibility, that “jurors generally accept
responsibility for the sentence they impose,” but that “the data also suggest ample room for
improvement.” Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical
Study, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 339, 379 (1996).
53. The effort by these jurors to take emotion out of their decision did not necessarily mean that
they were not affected by the magnitude of what they were doing. In trying to describe the enormous
responsibility that they had thrust upon them, jurors occasionally would invoke the idea that “it’s like
you’re playing God.” One juror who voted for death commented that “the whole process is very
disturbing . . . and I’ve been trying to get rid of the memory, knowing that this person has to live with
what we’ve decided—I sure didn’t like playing God.” Another juror, who had pushed hard for death,
did not use a divine metaphor but recalled, “[I]t was much more emotionally laden than I had
expected. I had thought it would be much more antiseptic, but it turned out to be much more personal,
essentially because we’re being asked to commit murder.” More often, jurors simply would explain, “I
don’t see how you can’t get emotionally involved with the case—you’re in up to your neck,” or
“unfortunately it was up to us,” or “[the judge] put it on us—he said, ‘you have all the information,
now you make the decision.’”
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another person as the linchpin to persuading the holdouts to change their
vote to death. Majority jurors would describe how their task “was just
convincing [the two holdouts] that it was okay to come to that verdict,
that’s what the system is all about, that’s what it’s for,” or “helping”
holdouts to recognize that “this is the law of the land” so that the
holdouts could “feel comfortable getting over” their doubts of whether
they had the right to take someone’s life. Sometimes the effort to relieve
the holdout’s anxieties was reinforced with the suggestion that even if the
holdout changed her vote to death, the chances of an execution were
slim: “[T]he only way to [change the holdouts’ vote] we knew, was to
convince the holdout jurors that more than likely he would never be
executed in this state—the possibility of him being executed is very
54
remote.”
Occasionally, the majority’s task focused on addressing a holdout’s
individualized worries. One life holdout, for instance, who had struggled
with whether she could be responsible for the death of another person
and had found the decision, in her own words, “very emotional,” also
had a particular concern if she changed her vote: How would she explain
a death sentence to her daughter who was vehemently opposed to the
death penalty? This juror explained that during the penalty phase, she
had often thought about her daughter’s feelings and worried, “[H]ow will
she look at me as her mother who now has convicted someone to a death
sentence?” To help this juror “cope” with her daughter’s reaction, the
other jurors rehearsed with her how to explain that the death penalty was
“the law of the land, we were the ones there [at trial], we heard the
facts.” The majority’s counseling session played a crucial part in
persuading the holdout that she could vote for death and handle the
reactions of others who “will say, how could you possibly do that?”
In trying to move life holdouts to a more “objective” view, the
ubiquitous charts often played a critical role. Indeed, many jurors
believed that the main virtue of the listing exercise was that it helped
exorcise the emotional component of the decision. As one juror noted,
“We tried to be objective—we used a blackboard to think in a linear,
non-emotional way.”
The listing charts had the particular potential to tilt the discussion
towards death. This was in part because frequently, especially if the

54. The ability to make this argument convincingly may depend on the state. In some states, such
as California, its relatively low execution rate (1.6% of all death sentences imposed) is well publicized;
other states, like Virginia and Texas, on the other hand, execute at much higher rates. See Executions
Per
Death
Sentence,
Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions-death-sentence (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (giving execution rates based on executions per
death sentence, ranging from Virginia, which has carried out executions for over two-thirds of the
death sentences imposed, to states like New Jersey, which, despite fifty-seven death sentences, never
carried out a single execution before abolishing the death penalty in 2007).
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defendant had prior convictions, the items on the aggravating side lent
themselves more readily to being listed, and, of course, every chart had
55
the murder of the victim at the top of the list. Moreover, the listing
charts tended to be particularly problematic for a defense that relied on
an overall theme based on a series of events to comprise a “story for
life.” In those cases, the chart had the potential of breaking apart the
overall story into a number of events that, alone, might not seem
particularly compelling. Thus, a defendant whose life story did not center
around events of a momentous magnitude (for example, a mother
committing suicide in front of him as a child) might not “chart well,”
because his was a story of a slow descent into mental illness, or a gradual
involvement in gang activity or drug use due to a lack of guidance from
56
parental figures. This effect of neutralizing the mitigating evidence
could be especially pronounced if the gradual descent at the same time
resulted in the defendant racking up aggravating factors in the form of
prior offenses that increased in severity from petty larceny to drug
offenses to murder—factors that charted well as aggravating factors.
Stated another way for those of a literary bent, a tragedy like Hamlet
might chart well because of the murder of Hamlet’s father, but the slow
and painful spiral of events that culminate in Tom Joad’s killing of a
police officer in the Grapes of Wrath might be far less compelling once
the narrative is broken into lists.
Moreover, the charts provided the majority jurors a tangible way of
communicating to the holdouts the majority’s view that the holdout was
clouding his or her decision with emotion. Some sense of how the listing
chart could influence the jury’s deliberations can be seen in one juror’s
account of how a chart played a critical role in changing her vote from
life to death (this juror was described by the majority jurors as a strong
holdout for life):
We got in there and we weren’t quite sure what to do. It was tough
and very tense deliberations. Somebody said what we need to do is we
need to go to the blackboard, and we need to write reasons for the
death penalty and reasons for life imprisonment. So we went over each.
We debated would that go for life or would that be death penalty or
would it fall somewhere in between? We had more disagreements
when we were looking at [the decision between life and death] as one
big clump, and one person saw it one way and one person saw it that
way. [The chart] really helped make things clear, and if we did have

55. Whether the victim was a random victim or in some way engaged in behavior that jurors saw
as leading to the crime often influenced the jurors’ decision. See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Capital
Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 343 (2003)
(discussing the role that the victim plays in a capital jury’s sentencing decision).
56. The ability of lists to influence decisionmaking is consistent with findings in other disciplines,
such as communication and organization theory. See Christopher Seeds, Strategery’s Refuge, 99 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 987, 1035–36 (2009). Professor Seeds insightfully contrasts decisionmaking
based on “lists” and “story telling” using another CJP case. Id. at 1034–37.
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that tense disagreement, we said okay that [factor] can fall in the
middle. It still took a while once we had it up on the board. It was
something you had to sit there and really, really think about. It wasn’t
like we looked at it and said, okay.
I was one of the last to vote for the death penalty. If I hadn’t been
able to look at these things independently, I don’t think I ever could
have come to a death penalty decision myself. I had to live with this
decision for the rest of my life, and I had to have reasons that I could
live with. I didn’t have them to begin with, and I wasn’t finding them
from what [the pro-death jurors] were saying [before we made the list].
So that’s why when we went to that infamous list, I was able to, in my
own mind, arrive at a death penalty decision and feel like I had
qualified it rather than just going along with people.

As the juror’s narrative makes clear, the process of dissecting and listing
the defendant’s case for life had the effect of taking away its emotional
impact on the juror when she reacted to the case as a “clump,” and
ultimately led her to vote for death based on the “reasons” put up on the
“infamous list.”
The effort to move the holdout away from a “personal” to a “legal”
view also often involved the majority querying the holdout on whether
she was being completely upfront about her reasons for resisting a death
sentence. At this point, the majority often returned to the Witherspoon
questions that had been asked during jury selection, which are intended
to keep someone who is opposed to the death penalty from serving on a
57
capital jury. The majority would ask the holdout if his or her reasons for
a life sentence were, at bottom, simply a personal inability to impose a
sentence of death. Jurors would tell the holdout, for instance, that “she
had stated sometime along the line that she could issue a death penalty if
warranted and now was not the time to change her mind,” or would
“remind [the] uncertain ones that they had testified that they could vote
for death.” The implicit, and sometimes explicit, suggestion being, of
course, that the holdouts had not been entirely honest with themselves
during jury selection in saying that they could impose the death penalty
and that they could follow the law. This line of questioning acted as a
chisel for chipping away at the legitimacy of the holdouts’ reasons for
favoring life and further characterized the divide as one based on those
who wanted to apply the law objectively—the majority favoring death—
and those who were defying their oaths by allowing their personal
emotions to dictate their vote—the life holdouts.
These questions were all the more powerful because the majority
jurors were not posing them as a rhetorical ploy, but because they
sincerely believed that the case for death was so strong that the only
logical explanation for the holdout’s disagreement was that she did not
believe in the death penalty. Moreover, the tone usually was not a direct
57. See discussion supra note 50.
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accusation to the holdout that “you lied,” but an almost sympathetic
commiseration that someone could easily think in the abstract that they
could impose a death sentence only to discover that the reality of sending
someone to the death chamber was much different. The message,
though, was the same: The holdout now needed to try and set aside her
personal feelings and live up to her oath to follow the law.
In chipping away at the legitimacy of the holdout’s views, majority
jurors also liked to pose hypotheticals to the holdout concerning what
more it would take to convince them to impose a death sentence:
Mutilation? Multiple victims? Holdouts’ responses that they would
impose the death penalty if the defendant had been a serial killer (or as
one death juror sarcastically characterized a holdout’s argument for life,
“[I]t was only one little murder[]”) were addressed by pointing out that
the jury instructions only required an intentional killing and not a series
of killings. Holdouts’ efforts to argue that the defendant appeared
remorseful were usually met with incredulity by majority jurors, who
would make comments such as, “[The holdout] said that she really
thought he was sorry and that if he had done it over it wouldn’t have
been done that way—[and] I said, ‘he would [have] done it the same darn
way, he would [have] been just a little more cautious,’” or “[the holdout]
kept saying . . . he wasn’t a bad person, yes, he shot someone five
times . . . but he’s really a nice guy.” Nor did more novel arguments fare
better, like the holdout who suggested that she wanted life because death
was “too easy” a punishment, as the defendant no longer would have to
live with the consequences of the murder. This argument was
sarcastically dismissed by a majority juror who stated, “[T]hat was [the
holdout’s] big thing you know, that [death] is not punishment enough,
and, ‘okay,’ I said, ‘so what are we going to do, are we going to torture
him?’” Under this type of intensive grilling, the holdout’s answers often
added to the appearance that she had not been totally honest in saying
that she could impose the death penalty where the law allowed it.
And if the holdout tried to counter that she could impose a death
sentence, but she did not believe this was a case for death because of the
defendant’s background, such as child abuse or mental illness, the
majority’s response usually was to chastise the holdout for forgetting
about the victim. A juror in one case remembered reaching a breaking
point because she thought that the holdout was totally focused on the
defendant:
I stood up, we had been talking it over again and finally I just said
something to the effect, “[Martha] just think if he took your son—
because she has a son—and held him in a small dark place and he
pointed a gun at him and while your son begged for his life for ten
minutes, he continued to shoot him with a pistol. Tell me how you feel
about that. Just think about it for a minute.” Then I made some big
speech and then jumped out of the room and slammed the door
because I was so mad I was going to kill her.
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Predictably, the emotional temperature in the jury room continued
to rise the longer the holdout insisted on life despite the majority’s
efforts to make him or her see that the law required a sentence of death.
At this juncture, the prospect of a hung jury often played an important
role. For the majority jurors pressing for death, the fear of a hung jury
and its consequences provided the motivation to continue trying to
persuade the holdout rather than to simply declare the jury hung.
Majority jurors for death would comment, for example, on how “the
evidence was so strong that we couldn’t take a chance on it being a
mistrial,” or that they “weren’t sure if he would have to be tried all over
for both parts [the guilt and penalty phases].” Demonstrating again how
58
jurors sometimes use misperceptions to fill informational voids, one
juror reported that the jury in his case had been convinced that a hung
jury on the sentence meant that the judge could impose a sentence less
than life or that the defendant might go free all together. As we will see,
these concerns about the consequences of a hung jury, often fueled by a
judge’s refusal to clarify what would happen if the jury hung, usually led
59
death holdouts to reluctantly agree to life. With a strong majority of
jurors for death, on the other hand, these same concerns acted to
reinvigorate the majority’s drive to obtain a death sentence. As the
prospects of a hung jury grew, so did the majority’s determination to
convert the life holdouts.
Moreover, in a number of juries, the majority jurors used the idea
that the holdout’s refusal to change her vote would result in a hung jury
as a way to further isolate the holdout and turn the pressure up several
notches: “We would talk about how awful it would be to have this whole
thing thrown out and retried because it was eleven-to-one. We really
harped on that.” This idea of unfairness—that one juror could dictate the
result against the wishes of eleven others—would often be coupled with
the idea that the holdout would then be responsible for the possible
consequences. One juror favoring death, for instance, described how his
jury used its belief, which unbeknownst to them was mistaken, that a
hung jury would result in the defendant receiving a whole new trial as an
argument against the holdout, stressing that “if they still chose not to
[change their vote to death], that one person is going to be given the
responsibility” of whether the defendant might end up “free or not.”

58. The Supreme Court has held that no constitutional right exists for the defendant to have the
jury informed of the consequences of a deadlocked jury. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382
(1999).
59. See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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C. Step Three: The Conversion of the Life Holdouts
One reason the conversion of life holdouts tended to be particularly
emotional and difficult—especially, as will be seen, when compared to
the conversion of death holdouts—was that a life holdout would change
his or her vote only if genuinely convinced that they had been mistaken
and that a life sentence was indeed the wrong choice. In other words, a
juror favoring life will not change her vote and send someone to the
death chamber if he or she simply sees the majority’s favoring of death as
an honest but understandable difference in opinion. To change the life
holdout’s vote, therefore, the majority jurors must actively convince the
holdout that a death sentence is the only right answer and that to cling to
a life vote is to defy the law and their oath as a juror. Unless the death
jurors can convince the life holdouts that they are wrong, life holdouts
almost always will refuse to vote for death simply to reach a unanimous
verdict. Even life holdouts who after the trial regretted changing their
vote to death stated that at the time they finally switched their voted to
death in the jury room, they had come to believe that a death sentence
was the “correct” outcome.
The moment of conversion for jurors who had held out for life
normally came as they felt increasingly isolated and began to be plagued
by self-doubts. Holdouts reported that after what seemed to be endless
rounds of trying to justify their position, they began to ask themselves
whether maybe, in fact, they were misunderstanding the law. Part of the
growing self-doubt was because the dynamics of the situation meant that
as the minority juror, the holdout was the one who was constantly being
asked to explain why she saw matters differently. The effect was to place
the burden on the life holdouts to justify their disagreement, to prove the
majority jurors wrong, or, as one majority juror summed up his jury’s
dealings with a single holdout: “[I]t was her against everybody.”
Moreover, the majority’s questioning of the holdouts was interlaced
with the belief that the holdouts’ difficulty was that they simply were not
comprehending how the law worked; in other words, they were not
understanding that two plus two equals four and not five. One juror’s
description of how his jury proceeded gives a sense of how this attitude
was intertwined throughout the majority’s interaction with the holdout:
So we kind of said to [the holdout] why do you say this? Why do you
feel this way? Do you have any feelings about your decision? Let’s go
over it . . . . We’d put it all on the board . . . and boom, boom, boom, we
discussed each and every one of these steps [with the holdout], so now
she could make her decision without us having any bearing on it, and it
worked great. We outlined it for her. She had cluttered the issues, and
this way she could say, “I feel better about it.”

As the juror’s comments reflect, the attitude being communicated to the
holdout was that she had made a mistake and, with all the attention
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intensely focused on her, the rest of the jury was intent on helping her
find the correct answer.
Sometimes the psychological isolation was further intensified by
how the majority reacted to the holdout’s resistance. One jury, for
instance, that had arrived at an eleven-to-one vote for death after several
ballots, asked the holdout to explain once again why she felt that way.
The holdout gave a response similar to her earlier ones, and the majority
proceeded to tell her why they still thought she was mistaken. At this
point, the holdout said she “needed some space,” so, as one of the
majority jurors explained, “to be respectful, we put her in the corner, and
she thought about it while we read books or chatted—the next vote was
unanimous.” Again, the majority’s intentions were honorable, to give her
space to think, but the message—physically reinforced by “put[ting] her
in the corner” in a manner reminiscent of a recalcitrant student being
sent to the corner of the classroom—was one highlighting her isolation as
the only person thinking that life was justified.
And while these Q&A sessions between the majority and minority
jurors usually started off fairly cordially, if they dragged on, the majority
could become less gentle in letting the holdout know that he or she stood
alone in their beliefs:
Oh, it got to the point where everybody started yelling at her and
screaming at her. . . . There was something missing that she just
couldn’t put her finger on and we kept telling her, “what the hell is it
that you don’t see?” You know, “what is it you don’t see?”

In one of the most dramatic examples, Professor Bowers and his
colleagues have reported an interview from Louisiana where ten jurors
wanting death literally formed a circle excluding the two jurors who
wanted life. As one of the two holdout jurors recalled:
[The ten jurors] went and sat on over in the little corner and discussed
it all without, without us. I remember it very well because we were
isolated, the black girl and I were not even allowed to sit with
them. . . . And so about three days and three nights of that, of isolating
themselves from us and we [were] not going to have anything to do
with it. She kind of broke down, and then I broke down, and I said,
“Well, what the heck, I’m not going to sit up here and send myself to
the hospital.” And, uh, she got sick to her stomach about the whole
thing and went into the bathroom and was vomiting. And I went in
there to help her, you know, and got a rag and was washing her face.
60
And they came in and told us to get out of the bathroom.

While most juries did not experience such overtly coercive tactics,
the very process of deliberation and identifying the basis for
disagreement was bound to foster a sense of isolation among even the

60. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the
Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 171, 252 (2001) (the verdict in
the case ended in a life sentence despite the majority jurors’ behavior).
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hardiest of holdouts. And, not surprisingly, with juries where a holdout
persisted in holding out for life for a substantial period of time, the
majority’s feelings of frustration would spike, and the holdout’s sense of
isolation would intensify; voices were raised, tables were pounded, and
tears were shed. One juror’s description of her jury’s deliberations was
consistently echoed by jurors in other cases with strong holdouts: “There
was one holdout, a woman, and she held out for a long time—it came
down to eleven people to convince her [and] she was crying a lot while
we were convincing her.”
Intriguingly, though, many of the holdouts announced their switch
to death not at the height of such emotional exchanges, but after a pause
in the deliberations and a momentary respite from the heated arguments.
Sometimes the calm in the storm simply was adjourning for the night,
other times a majority juror—often the foreperson—would suggest that
the jury needed to take a break to calm down, or the holdout would
request a chance to think by herself (although finding a place of refuge
usually meant locking oneself in the bathroom or sitting off in a corner).
While the majority jurors exhibited no conscious design of trying to
trigger a holdout to change her vote by providing a temporary sanctuary
from the majority’s interrogation, psychologists have found that where
individuals have resisted group pressure, sometimes the removal of the
pressure will trigger the change in position that the pressure itself would
61
not.
The life holdouts’ description of the sense of isolation and selfdoubt that crept in as the deliberations dragged on also has a strong basis
in psychological research. In a famous experiment, social psychologist
Solomon Asch asked the subject to perform the exceedingly simple task
of identifying which of three lines on one side of a board was the same
62
length as a line on the other side. Asch’s twist, however, was that two
individuals who were a part of the experiment went first and were
instructed to choose one of the incorrect lines as the match. An
astonishing 75% of the experiment’s subjects then chose to disregard
what their own eyes were telling them and instead identified the same
63
incorrect line as that chosen by the confederates. When later debriefed,
the subjects easily identified the correct line but stated that when the
other individuals had identified the incorrect line, they had doubted
61. Jack W. Brehm & Millard Mann, Effect of Importance of Freedom and Attraction to Group
Members on Influence Produced by Group Pressure, 31 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 816, 823
(1975).
62. Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in Documents of Gestalt Psychology 222, 223–24 (Mary Henle ed., 1961) [hereinafter
Asch, Effects of Group Pressure]; Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I.
A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 Psychol. Monographs: Gen. & Applied 1, 68–70
(1956).
63. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 62, at 223–28.
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themselves, thinking that perhaps they had misunderstood the
64
instructions, or that their eyes were failing them. Later variations of the
study have found that the tendency to doubt one’s self and the desire to
conform to the judgment of others is particularly strong where the task
involves value judgments, where one’s opinion must be stated in front of
65
others, and when only two options are given to choose between —
scenarios with obvious parallels to a capital jury’s penalty phase
deliberations.
D. Step Four: Welcoming the Holdout Back into the Fold
When the holdout did announce that she finally was ready to vote
for death, the moment of conversion usually was fraught with emotion,
especially if protracted deliberations had severely frayed the jurors’
patience with each other. The release of emotion did not just come from
the holdout, as the entire jury had been under tremendous stress trying
to reach a unanimous decision. Jurors recalled the moment with
descriptions such as “[the holdout] cried, we all cried, there was not a dry
eye in the jury room—it was very emotional,” or “people were very
upset, people cried and not just the women.” After the holdout’s decision
to make the verdict unanimous, the majority often tried to welcome the
holdout back into the “family” with gestures of reconciliation, such as
66
giving the holdout a hug or a consoling pat on the back.
Majority jurors usually described the catalyst for a life holdout’s
conversion as recognition of the correctness of the majority’s viewpoint.
Sometimes this recognition was ascribed to having “worked out their
doubts,” or to having “come to grips” with the decision, or sometimes to
the holdout not having understood the law at first. In most instances, the
majority jurors thought that the process of conversion had been
accomplished without coercion, and while a small percentage of majority
jurors did attribute a holdout’s change of vote to the majority’s pressure
67
rather than a change in heart, even those jurors usually did not convey
any sense that the result was unjust or unfair. They may have been
uneasy with the process, but they also tended to believe that the pressure
had only hastened the holdout’s arrival at what everyone, including the
64. Id.
65. Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 Ohio St. L.J.
687, 704 & nn.74–75 (1990); see also Sundby, supra note 37, at 81–84 (summarizing psychological
research on conformity).
66. One of the more unusual conciliatory acts that has been reported occurred at the trial of
ousted Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega for narcotics smuggling: The jury, which had earlier
prayed with the holdout, filled the jury room with Gospel hymns after finally reaching unanimity to
convict. William Booth & Michael Isikoff, Noriega Jury Frustrated by Lone Holdout, Wash. Post,
Apr. 11, 1992, at A1.
67. One juror, for example, stated with respect to a holdout, “She [finally] went [for] the death
penalty, I think more so on pressure[.] I think she felt pressure.”
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holdouts, knew was the correct verdict. As one juror explained, “I
wouldn’t have allowed [a majority juror] to browbeat [the holdout] to
that extent if I didn’t think that [the holdout] really felt he should receive
68
the death penalty.”

V. The Persuasion of Death Holdouts to Reach a Unanimous
Verdict of Life
When the focus is switched to juries that returned a life sentence,
the deliberative process in many ways mirrors the one followed by death
juries. They approached the evidence in a similar fashion by making
charts, and followed the same four steps leading up to the announcement
of the verdict. At the same time, as would be expected given the different
sentencing outcomes, a number of important differences arose in how
jurors responded to majority pressure, in the arguments that were put
forward, and in the reasons why the death holdouts eventually changed
their vote to life.
A. Step One: Forming a United Front in Favor of Life
Juries that returned unanimous life verdicts were similar in
consolidating and strengthening their views through the deliberation
process, but with several intriguing variations. Because life juries
occasionally began with as few as three jurors voting for life, in some
cases the consolidation process revolved around first cementing a bloc of
69
minority jurors for life. A juror in a case who had been with the initial
majority for death observed with some exasperation that “there were
four to five jurors who were like-minded [for life] and in agreement from
the start. They saw eye to eye, stuck up for each other, and made it hard
to have a one-on-one discussion.” A juror in another case similarly
described how two jurors immediately formed an alliance:
We went around the room and we decided that each one should say
what they feel and why. It was then we discovered that we had one
person who honestly and completely did not believe in the death
penalty. He said that the reason he got on the jury was that he had said
if everyone else agree[d] he would have [to] go along with it, but his
personal thought was that we do not kill people. He said that if the
whole jury said death he’d have no choice but to go along with it, but
that opened up a whole new door because then we had another guy
who said, “I have such respect for this man for being so honest in

68. A fifth step, the announcement of the verdict of death, still lay ahead for the jury. Because of
the shared similarities with juries that reached life verdicts, the final step for life and death juries is
described together. See infra Part VI.
69. In their study of non-capital cases, Waters and Hans likewise found that the larger the
minority faction disagreeing with the majority’s viewpoint, the more likely the dissenters would
“hang” the jury rather than acquiesce to the majority position. Waters & Hans, supra note 25, at 523–
24, 537–38.
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saying that he doesn’t believe in the death penalty that, then, I too
won’t vote for the death penalty.”

While the jurors favoring death strongly suspected that the second juror
also had been deceptive about being able to impose the death penalty,
the two jurors were joined by a third juror voting for life, and the alliance
of these three jurors was to prove so unshakeable as to eventually swing
the entire jury to life. In cases like these, therefore, unlike in death cases,
if a minority of jurors favoring life could unite and provide initial support
to each other in refusing to yield to the majority’s view, the minority
70
viewpoint eventually could overtake the jury’s verdict.
The other intriguing variation between life and death majority
jurors was that the life jurors did not tend to view those jurors favoring
death as being irrational or not willing to follow the law. This did not
mean, of course, that death holdouts were necessarily viewed in a
flattering light. Occasional comments were made suggesting that the
death holdouts had been rigid (“unwilling to compromise”), lacked
compassion (“they didn’t want the taxpayers to feed the defendants the
rest of their lives”), and were overly concentrated on the crime (“[T]hey
would not take into account anything else, pure and simple.”). And
sometimes the observations were phrased in less than congenial terms
(“old rednecks”), or implied that the death holdout had been less
educated (“[H]e was an Archie Bunker.”), or had ulterior motives (“[H]e
was trying to get out of work and focusing attention on himself.”).
Reminiscent of the “unnatural attachment” comments about the life
holdouts, a few remarks were made suggesting that a death holdout had
become fixated on the victim’s family, such as the comment by the juror
who observed:
We had one person in there that . . . felt some kind of connection to
[the victim’s] family. She sat closest to the family, they were always in
the same spot in the audience, and she was always looking over at
them, so she always brought that up quite a bit.

Generally missing from the life jurors’ commentary, however, was
the strong sense that anyone favoring death in their case had to be
70. That individuals are able to resist majority pressure if they have the support of others is also
well established in the psychological literature. Asch did follow-up experiments to the “line
experiment.” See supra note 62 and accompanying text. He found that if he included just one person
who chose the correct answer, even while increasing the number of individuals identifying the
incorrect line, the chances of the experiment’s subject choosing the correct answer increased
significantly. Asch concluded, “It is clear that the presence of . . . one other individual who responded
correctly was sufficient to deplete the power of the majority, and in some cases to destroy it.” Asch,
Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 62, at 231. Asch also discovered, however, that when he further
varied the experiment so that the one confederate who initially responded correctly then “deserted” to
the majority’s incorrect position in the middle of the experiment, the subject’s “experience of having
had and then lost a partner restored the majority effect to its full force, . . . point[ing] to a fundamental
psychological difference between the condition of being alone and having a minimum of human
support.” See id. at 232.
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wrongheaded and mistaken. In other words, while the death jurors
generally began with an unwavering premise that a death sentence was
the one and only correct outcome, the life jurors’ starting premise in
trying to persuade the death holdouts usually was that a life sentence was
the best outcome, but they could understand how someone might argue
for death (and, of course, to sit on a capital jury, even a juror favoring life
in a case will have affirmed to the court that he or she could vote for a
71
death sentence under certain circumstances). This difference in starting
points meant that life jurors were less likely to see those favoring death
as having personality problems, as having lied to get onto the jury, as
unable to face reality, or as simply being unable to see the “right”
answer. This did not mean that life jurors always were kinder and gentler
in trying to persuade the death holdouts, but, as will be seen, the
different starting premises often led to different tactics and arguments.
B. Step Two: The “Education” and Isolation of the Holdouts
As with the juries that returned a death sentence, once a clear
majority had formed in favor of life, the burden was in effect shifted to
the minority jurors favoring death. The process again tended to play out
as a series of questions directed by the majority jurors at the holdouts,
whose answers in turn were likely to elicit multiple responses from the
majority jurors favoring life. One majority juror on a jury that found
itself standing at eleven-to-one for life, for example, explained how his
jury questioned a holdout for death:
We just said, “[W]ell show us then inside the [jury] instructions and tell
us the reasons why you think this way . . . .” I should say that we
weren’t saying you don’t know what you’re talking about. We didn’t
try to bias this person. We said, “[W]ell, how did you arrive at that?”
We tried to make it so that only one person was talking at a time so
you didn’t have three or four people trying to stress their point home.
We made it up front prior to even talking to her that we’re not trying
to sway her—just let us know, maybe we made the mistake.

While the majority jurors in the case were trying to be open-minded and
non-coercive (and this attitude appeared to be genuine), the upshot of
the majority’s question to the holdout was to ask, “So, tell us why you
alone are right in wanting death and the eleven of us are mistaken in
believing that life is the proper penalty.”
It was at this point, as the deliberations came to a crossroads of
either reaching a unanimous verdict or having to declare itself hopelessly
stalemated, that the majority’s tactics often diverged between life and
death juries. The critical juncture was the same—convincing the holdouts
that they needed to switch their votes to reach unanimity—but the

71. See supra note 50 (discussing death qualification of capital jurors).
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arguments and holdouts’ reasons for changing often differed between life
and death juries.
As seen earlier, life holdouts would change their vote to death only
if the majority jurors convinced the holdouts that, indeed, they had
misunderstood the law and that death was in fact the sentence required
72
by the circumstances of the case. By comparison, life jurors trying to
persuade a death holdout have a somewhat easier task. The life jurors do
not have to ask the death holdout to give up her passionate belief that
the defendant deserves death, but only to agree to settle for what is still
an extremely severe sentence of life without parole. In other words, life
jurors need not actively convince the death holdout that the holdout’s
desire for a sentence of death is wrong and that a life sentence is the only
right answer. Rather, the majority need only convince the death holdout
that a sentence of life without parole is sufficient to fulfill the jury’s duty,
even if it may not fully satisfy the holdout’s sense of full justice.
In undertaking this task, life jurors directed a variety of arguments
at death holdouts, or as one juror put it, “[W]e shared with [the holdout]
why he should vote life.” As would be expected, much attention was
given to convincing the holdouts that a life sentence would not be an
easy sentence for the defendant (“[T]hey kept working on the one guy,
they told him that life without parole wasn’t going to be easy, a sweet
young guy in prison wasn’t going to have an easy time.”). Majority jurors
also would try to pry the holdouts’ focus away from the victim and
towards the horrors of the defendant’s childhood or other mitigating
circumstances: “We put the holdout in [the defendant’s] family—if it was
your brother, would he deserve death?” A juror in another case told of
how “there were some very human appeals made by certain individuals
on the ability to show mercy. And guilt to an extent was used—it’s like,
‘are you that hard of a person that you can’t find mercy in your heart,’
things like that.” A life juror in another case reminded the holdout that
he had promised during voir dire, in response to what are known as
reverse-Witherspoon questions, that he would not automatically impose a
73
death sentence. The juror then said to the holdout, “God damn it, if you
told them that you could decide for life, what more mitigating
circumstances do you need to hear, how much worse could someone’s
life be that you can’t even consider life as a possibility?” In cases where
lingering doubt existed about the defendant’s role in the murder, life

72. See supra Part IV.C.
73. The Supreme Court has held that a capital defendant has the right not to have a juror sit who
automatically would impose the death penalty, just as the State has a right not to have a juror sit on a
capital case who could not impose the death penalty. See supra note 50. As a result, a potential capital
juror is asked questions during voir dire (the “reverse-Witherspoon questions”) to ensure that the
juror would be able to consider mitigating evidence arguing for a sentence less than death. Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1992).
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jurors had additional leverage to persuade those for death: “[W]e
weren’t 100 percent sure if he pulled the trigger . . . [and] suppose
something came up . . . you couldn’t change your vote if he’s already
74
been killed.”
C. Step Three: The Conversion of the Death Holdouts
These arguments swayed some votes to life, especially those who
had not been strongly for death, and softened the position of many other
jurors who earnestly had argued for death. Ultimately, however, the
most ardent holdouts for death appeared to change their votes primarily
for one reason: the fundamental desire to avoid another trial.
In instances where a death holdout was changing his or her vote to
life, a judge’s “persistence” (as one juror termed it) in returning the jury
to deliberations often triggered the decision to switch their vote to
achieve unanimity. Faced with the realization that the life jurors were not
going to budge, some death holdouts finally changed their votes just to
end the deadlock. Such holdouts would explain, often with a prefatory
remark that certain jurors had “lied” to get on the jury because they had
not really believed in the death penalty, that, “I gave in because I didn’t
want a retrial.” Or, as another juror more elaborately described her
switch:
Juror: We asked to speak to the judge, that we were deadlocked
and did it have to be twelve people agreeing and what would happen if
some of the people absolutely wouldn’t change their mind, would it
become a hung jury? And he told us that they would have to get a new
75
panel and get twelve jurors and hear the penalty phase again. And the
people at that point, the two people who felt he should have the death
penalty, figured if they have to go through that they’re never going to
find twelve people for the death penalty, so it would be a waste of time.
So at that point, the two people really didn’t have that much choice but
to change their mind under pressure.
Interviewer: Under pressure?
Juror: Yeah.
Interviewer: Sounds like you were one of those two people?

74. The role of lingering or residual doubt as a mitigating factor is complicated. Jurors will say
that if they had a doubt that the defendant was in fact the person who committed the crime, they
would vote for a life sentence; they then, however, almost always proceed to explain that they never
would have voted guilty in the first place if they had entertained any doubts. By contrast, lingering
doubt over the defendant’s role in the crime or motive—for example, uncertainty over whether the
defendant was the triggerman—often is a persuasive mitigating factor for jurors. See Scott E. Sundby,
The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty,
83 Cornell L. Rev. 1557, 1577–84 (1998).
75. The practices of instructing jurors on the consequences of a deadlocked jury vary. See supra
note 58 (explaining that there is no constitutional right to have the jury instructed on the consequences
of a deadlocked jury at the penalty phase).
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Juror: Yeah. There was no way [the ten jurors for life were going to
change their mind.] The more I tried to reason with them, the more
they clung to their view. It was a waste of time.

Another death holdout’s anger at having to change his vote because
people had “lied” to get on the jury resurfaced during the interview.
Asked why he finally changed his vote to life, the juror snapped back,
voice rising, “because I’m not going to spend the rest of my life here
discussing it. How about that? Does that make sense?”
The death holdouts’ decision to change their vote once they realized
that the majority’s position for life was unyielding was usually
accompanied by a further rationale as to why a life sentence, even if not
their initial preference, would be acceptable. Sometimes the holdout
would explain that he or she became convinced that a life sentence
actually would be the safer way to keep the defendant locked away
forever. For example, one holdout explained that at the time of their
deliberations, he heard on the news about a death sentence that had
been overturned. He stated that even though he knew that the jury was
supposed to consider only the evidence, he became convinced that a
murder conviction and death sentence would be overturned “on some
trumped up reason like inadequate defense or newly discovered brain
damage.” For this juror, as with most jurors no matter their sentence
preference, a reversal of the defendant’s conviction was the one
possibility to be guarded against at all costs. The juror thought the safest
option, therefore, would be to acquiesce to a life sentence in the belief
that it would lessen the chance that the conviction would be overturned
on appeal.
Death holdouts also frequently voiced the concern that a death
sentence would simply trigger an ad infinitum appeals process:
[I]f we imposed the death penalty it would be meaningless because
there would be appeal after appeal after appeal and it would go on and
on and cost the state a lot of money, and it would keep the defendant
hanging on Death Row. So nothing would be resolved—just give him
life in prison.

Another juror noted that the appeals process would add the aggravation
of the case never going away for the jurors: “What’s the point of sending
him to the death row? He’s just going to appeal for the next twenty years
and we’re going to have to read about it for all those years, and the
taxpayers are going to have to pay for all of it.” Another death holdout
after saying that he changed his vote “only [because] I didn’t want a hung
jury,” added “[and] if death is given, they don’t get death, they sit on
76
death row, so he’s going to get [life] anyway.” Consequently, these

76. As noted earlier, the strength of this perception may vary by state depending on execution
rates within each state. See supra note 54.
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death holdouts, believing that insisting on a death sentence might lead to
more litigation and uncertainty, changed their vote to life.
Especially worrying for death holdouts, however, was the possibility
that if they hung the jury by holding out for death, not only would the
defendant receive a new sentencing hearing, but his conviction for capital
murder also might become unraveled. This concern often was expressed
to the judge through a question asking what would happen if they were
unable to reach a unanimous decision. Some judges did inform the jury
of what would occur: The capital murder conviction would stand and the
prosecutor would decide whether to seek a new penalty phase with a new
77
jury. Often, though, the judge would decline to explain, telling the jury,
as one juror recalled, “that it wasn’t any of their concern.”
Faced with this uncertainty, especially the misperceived possibility
that the defendant might be tried again and found guilty of a lesser crime
or, worse yet, be acquitted, death holdouts would explain that they
“absolutely did not want to hang,” because “we did not want to risk the
defendant getting away later, and we didn’t know the consequences of
not agreeing.” One death holdout faced with a judge who “refused to tell
us what would happen,” felt a sense of “hopelessness” and changed his
vote to life because he “didn’t know what would happen.” A juror in
another case remembered the judge as responding: “And don’t even ask
unless that is your true, absolute situation, and triple-check before asking
again.” This response led the death holdouts to believe the jury was
“getting into big trouble areas,” so they changed their votes to avoid
being hung. Another death holdout faced with the judge’s “unhelpful”
refusal to clarify recounted:
So it finally dwindled down to me and another guy, we were the last
two to hang on, and it came down to the last vote, and this took about
a week and a half to decide, so we finally gave him life so we wouldn’t
have to have a complete mistrial and have another trial.

A juror in the same case who had favored life recounted how the jurors
arguing for life had used the judge’s refusal to explain the consequences
to their advantage: “[We] told them we had worked very hard over the
past three months to find [the defendant] guilty of first-degree murder,
and what if we couldn’t reach a decision and the next jury came in and
found him guilty of a lesser crime?” Given a vacuum of information, the
jury had answered the question that the judge had refused to answer with

77. The consequences of a hung jury at the penalty phase vary by jurisdiction. While in
California the result is the retrial of the penalty phase, in some states and in federal death penalty
cases, a hung jury at the penalty phase will result in a life verdict. See David McCord, Lightning Still
Strikes: Evidence from the Popular Press That Death Sentencing Continues to Be Unconstitutionally
Arbitrary More than Three Decades After Furman, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 797, 824 & n.92 (2005) (noting
that in most jurisdictions a hung jury results in a life sentence, but that Arizona, California, and
Kentucky permit the retrial of a penalty phase that ends in a hung jury).
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a worst case scenario of a whole new trial, and the death holdouts, faced
with either becoming a hung jury or voting for life, opted to take what
78
they saw as the safe option of agreeing to life (recall, however, that
uncertainty about the consequences of being hung also could push a jury
towards a death sentence if the jury’s majority was favoring death over
79
life).
Sometimes juries found unique ways to extend an olive branch to
the death holdouts, while still reaching unanimity for life. Two juries, for
instance, found themselves deadlocked in favor of life by respective tento-two and eleven-to-one margins, but with the death holdouts strongly
resisting the majority. Independently, both juries found a similar solution
to the impasse through the jury instructions. As part of the instructions,
the jury was told that while they could impose a death sentence if they
determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating, they were never required to do so. In other words, the jury
was always free to choose a life sentence or, as it is sometimes stated, was
free to exercise mercy. These two juries reached an agreement with their
holdouts that the jury unanimously would agree that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances (the death
holdout’s position), and the holdout in return would agree to join the
majority in exercising mercy by voting for life. One death holdout
explained that this “compromise” had allowed him to switch his vote to
life in good conscience, because it vindicated his concerns by recognizing
the horror of the crime and the importance of the victim. Even some of
the jurors favoring life saw the compromise as more than a makeshift
diplomatic solution: “[It allowed] our jury [to] kind of made a statement
[to the defendant] that what you did was totally, totally unacceptable,
you cannot treat a human life like that, but it still allowed us to show
mercy by giving him life where the choices were life or death.”
Still another jury creatively broke a deadlock with a holdout who
throughout the deliberations had focused on the need to give the victim’s
family “justice,” strenuously arguing that a life sentence would make the
survivors feel like the victim’s life had been forgotten in the process.
After a number of rounds of the same give-and-take, one of the majority
jurors came up with a proposal that the holdout switch his vote to life but
then personally contact the victim’s family and let them know that he had
championed their cause in the jury room and that everyone recognized

78. Similar concerns apparently motivated some jurors to vote for life in the sentencing of John
Lee Malvo (one of the Beltway juvenile snipers). See Michelle Boorstein, Mistaken Belief About
Mistrial Troubles Jurors, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 2003, at B1 (“Jurors deciding whether to sentence Lee
Boyd Malvo to life in prison or death said this week they had feared that if they did not come to a
unanimous decision, a mistrial would be declared—an erroneous belief that led several who believed
Malvo should die to vote to spare his life.”).
79. See supra Part IV.C.
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that the victim’s death was a terrible tragedy. With that concession, the
holdout changed his vote to life.
And, of course, in the background of these decisions was always the
80
specter of the meaning of life without parole. As strong as the death
holdouts’ desire was to avoid a hung jury, many of the holdouts were
adamant that they never would have changed their vote if they also had
not been convinced of one fundamental fact: Life without parole meant
that the defendant would never get out of prison. Death holdouts
typically would explain that “[o]nce I was able to accept the fact that he
wasn’t going to walk in ten years or twelve years, that he would spend
the rest of his life in prison, it changed my vote,” or that “the major
factor [in persuading me to change my vote] was the [judge’s] assurance
that [the defendant] would be in jail forever.”
One last factor that appeared to persuade some death holdouts to
change their vote can be attributed to what psychologists have termed
leniency bias: the inclination of those favoring a harsher outcome to
resolve doubts in favor of leniency when confronted with a sizeable
81
group arguing for a more lenient disposition. Death holdouts faced with
a number of jurors arguing for life sometimes recalled their discomfort in
arguing for death when most of the other jurors were for life. One juror,
for instance, observed, “[I]t’s extremely difficult to sit and say you don’t
think someone deserves to live—we weren’t going to sit and fight with
people to get someone killed.” Another juror stated, “[W]e knew it
would [be] an uphill battle from when we took the first vote [and only
four jurors voted for death], because it’s harder to convince people for
death than it is for life.” And as one juror who had argued for death
before finally switching his vote explained, “I changed my vote to give
[the defendant] the benefit of a doubt, it was a matter of being humane.”
Yet another holdout noted that while he had argued strongly for death
because he believed the defendant deserved death, “in my heart it was
okay to give life knowing that [Ricky] was going to in jail for the rest of
his life,” and that voting for life had been “a lot easier” than arguing for
death. Of course, yielding to a leniency bias may be easier when being
lenient still means that the defendant will spend the remainder of his life
in prison.
D. Step Four: Reconciliation, More or Less
Some death holdouts came to peace with changing their vote, but a
fair number of holdouts continued to express great dissatisfaction with
the life verdict after the trial, lamenting that their juries had not had the
“guts to stand behind our guilty verdict [and impose] death,” or had

80. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
81. Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 41, at 322.
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“wimped out when it came to the penalty phase.” Another holdout,
when asked if he wished he had done anything differently, said that in
retrospect, “I wish it had been a hung jury; we gave in too easily on the
penalty part.” These were jurors who had strongly believed that death
was the only just verdict and had trouble accepting that the other jurors
had not agreed.
In contrast to death majority jurors who usually saw a life holdout’s
change in vote as a result of the holdout realizing that he or she was
“mistaken,” life majority jurors frequently—and correctly—attributed a
death holdout’s change in vote to a pragmatic decision to avoid a hung
jury, rather than to an acceptance of the majority’s position of favoring a
life sentence. A life juror recalled how the two death holdouts had left
the room when it became evident that the other jurors would not vote for
death, and “I’ll never forget the look on [one holdout’s] face [when they
returned]. She was pissed. They said, ‘[W]e don’t want to become a hung
jury; we don’t like our decision [to change our vote to life], but that’s the
decision we’re making.’” This life juror could not resist glancing at the
holdout as the judge read “life in prison” and observed that it was
evident that the holdout was “enraged.”
Perhaps the starkest evidence that some death holdouts changed
their minds not because of a change in heart but to avoid hanging the
jury was the consolation they sometimes took in speculating about the
defendant’s life in prison. One death holdout, for example, stated that he
finally agreed to a life sentence because “[the defendant] would probably
be tormented himself in [jail].” Another holdout consoled herself that by
switching her vote to life, she had both saved the state money by not
allowing the defendant to pursue endless appeals and had actually
enhanced the chances that the defendant would be executed, only now
the execution would be by rival gang members in jail rather than through
the far less reliable mechanisms of the state’s legal machinery. Still
another holdout, who had been quiet and introspective throughout the
interview, calmly revealed that he was able to “give up a death sentence”
because AIDS was epidemic in the prison system, and he knew,
therefore, that the defendant was certain to contract the disease and die a
slow, painful death.

VI. The Final Step: Surviving the Verdict
One might have expected that after a jury’s tribulations in reaching
unanimity, the announcement of the verdict would be the easy part.
Juries, however, invested a surprising amount of energy into the process.
Even for juries that had settled on a life sentence, the verdict’s
announcement was a moment full of drama as the defendant stood
waiting to hear whether he would live or die. As the clerk or judge read
the verdict of “life,” jurors varied widely in their reactions. Some jurors
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cried because it was “finally over,” while some who had unsuccessfully
held out for death felt anger and even rage because the jury had refused
to return a sentence of death. Occasionally the defendant added to the
drama, like the defendant who “raised his hand like, ‘yeah!’” and
pumped his lawyer’s hand as the clerk announced the life sentence. The
juror who angrily recalled the incident had struggled mightily with
whether a life sentence was a sufficiently severe sentence, and the
defendant’s acting as if he had won a sporting contest “really made me
mad. I was pissed, I was, I swear to God—that one thing really sticks in
my mind.” By contrast, a different jury, and one of the few that had
readily arrived at a unanimous life sentence, shook the defendant’s hand
and wished him luck as they filed out after the verdict was read.
Not surprisingly, however, it was the announcement of a death
verdict that invariably filled the air with tension. Lawyers may be
surprised, since having the jury polled is treated as something of a
formality, that jurors sometimes had strong reactions to being polled.
They often reacted with surprise during the guilt phase when the defense
attorney first would request that the jury be polled (“[W]hat did she
think, we’re going to lie?”), and sometimes were alarmed to hear their
name being stated over and over in front of the defendant. As one juror
recounted, “The worst part of the trial was when the jury was polled on
the 21 counts [at the guilt phase] in open court. ‘[Leo Martinez], how did
you vote?’—21 times! I cringed every time they said my name like that,
it’s easy to remember someone’s name when it’s said 21 times.”
Because the jury already would have been polled at the guilt stage,
jurors knew when it was time for the penalty verdict to be announced
that they would be polled. As would be expected, the polling process was
particularly stressful for juries who had dealt with a protracted life
holdout and knew that the holdout would now be forced to individually
announce “death” in front of the courtroom. A juror in one case
captured well the emotional turmoil that polling could cause for such a
jury. After describing the torturous deliberations that had culminated in
the holdout agreeing to vote death, the juror found the interval between
the holdout telling the jury that she would change her vote and the
announcement of the verdict agonizing: “[The holdout] was crying very
hard . . . she just [kept saying] this was the toughest thing she ever had to
do in her life, and it was for all of us.” The juror found the subsequent
polling of the jury bordering on cruelty. When first asked if the judge had
polled the jury, the juror had replied, “Bastard, yeah he did.” She then
continued:
We had to say “yes” [we voted for] the death penalty, [which] I
thought was pretty shitty. You know, you vote, it’s on paper, then why
[make us stand up] to this guy’s face and say, “[Y]eah, we want you to
die.” I just didn’t think that was right.
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Particularly galling for the juror was that the judge appeared
callously oblivious to what the jury was going through as they were being
polled. Although the jury box was full of sobbing jurors, the juror saw
the judge acting as if a ho-hum business meeting had just concluded:
“[T]he judge then tells you, ‘[T]hank you for fulfilling your civic duty,
and have a [happy holiday]’—and I was furious—and then he says,
‘[W]ell, we’ll walk you to your cars.’”
While jurors may not have liked the procedure, realizing that they
would be polled did lead many juries that were returning death sentences
to double-check that all of the jurors were prepared to announce “death”
in open court. Jurors occasionally would report that after reaching
unanimity their jury would wait before summoning the bailiff, just to
make sure that no one would change their minds. A foreman in one case
had warned his jury,
[W]e’d probably be polled and to make sure before we knocked on
[the jury room] door and said we had our decision, that everybody was
[100 %] sure, because we’d be polled and we’d be asked individually,
and how kind of foolish it would be if someone decided to change their
mind in-between.

Juries that were under the greatest stress, of course, were those that
had a life holdout who was seen as wavering despite having changed their
vote to death. As one juror on a jury with such a life holdout noted, they
had discovered at the guilt phase that “there’s something about saying it
that is different than just doing it on a piece of paper where nobody
knows who you are.” As a result, the other jurors had real concerns that
the converted holdout might “fall apart” in open court when questioned
by the authoritative figure of the judge and feeling the defendant’s eyes
upon him. Because of such concerns, some juries in this situation actually
practiced being polled, conducting a dress rehearsal; as one juror
described it, “[I]nstead of just taking a paper count, we went around the
room a couple of times, and we’d have to say [death] like we’d have to
say it in the courtroom.” Bowers and his colleagues report one juror’s
story of how a jury in such a case “coached” the holdout in an effort to
make sure that his vote for death survived the polling process:
Everybody finally decided, with the exception of the older black
gentleman, he was still very unsure until the last, I would say up until
the last 30 minutes. He was very upset about saying “yes” to the death
penalty. And I was afraid that when we went back out and the judge
asked each one of us how we, how we pleaded, I was afraid he was
gonna say “not sure” or “no,” but he did say [yes] . . . . I told him when
the judge talks to you, just say, “yassir” . . . . I don’t want to use the
82
word we coached into saying “yes,” but I guess in reality we did.

82. Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 255 (alteration in original).
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Juries whose deliberations had revolved around converting a strong
life holdout were also the ones where the actual polling in the courtroom
became a private drama for the jury as they sat there wondering if the
holdout would change his or her vote at the last moment. One juror
recalled his nervousness as the judge announced “death,” and he cast a
sidelong glance at the holdout and saw her “g[etting] all upset, I could
see her start, like she wanted to take it back.” In the end, however, as
with all the cases in the study, once the jury’s verdict had been
announced, no juror actually voted differently when polled.

Concluding Observations
Given the central role that juries play in our capital punishment
system, it is essential that we gain a clear understanding of how jurors
make the decision whether to impose a death sentence. In particular,
drawing back the curtain on how capital juries reach unanimity offers
insights into how lawyers might structure their case to enhance the
likelihood of a life sentence.
In light of the critical importance that one vote might make in
83
tipping the jury towards life or death, the obvious first lesson is the need
to use voir dire to seat a jury most open to the defendant’s case in
mitigation. This involves both identifying those jurors who in fact are not
open to mitigation (and may not be readily identifiable without extensive
questioning), as well those jurors who will be most receptive to the
84
defendant’s life story.
Next, the lawyer will want to try to shape the conversation that will
occur in the jury room once the jurors begin to deliberate. In particular,
this will mean anticipating the different types of charts that the jurors are
likely to use. With the expectation that the jurors may make a listing
chart, for example, a defense attorney in her closing argument can
present the narrative for the case for life with labels for different
episodes in the defendant’s life that would help jurors favoring life to
85
articulate items to list. In similar fashion, a defense lawyer can provide a
chronology of the defendant’s life that will help configure the timeline
86
that the jury is likely to make once back in the jury room.
Most fundamentally, however, the defense lawyer’s task is to
provide possible life holdouts the tools in advance to resist the pressures

83. See supra Part I (detailing differences depending on how many jurors vote for death on the
first ballot).
84. See Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation, supra note 35, at 1058–62 (describing
techniques for “life qualification” of jurors).
85. This strategy was suggested by Professor Andrea Lyon at a faculty workshop as a way of
trying to influence how the listing chart might look.
86. See Sundby, supra note 37, at 141–42 (describing instances where lawyers actively
characterized the case for life to help shape jurors’ perception of the defendant’s timeline).
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of the majority once they retire to the jury room. This requires a strategy
that insulates jurors favoring life from being convinced by the majority
jurors that their position is an illegitimate one because they are in some
sense not following the law. This strategy begins as early as voir dire, by
instilling in every potential juror an understanding that the law
recognizes that the death penalty is a moral judgment for each individual
87
juror to make. This understanding means, in turn, that as with any
moral judgment, individuals may differ on the merits and each juror is
entitled to respect for his or her individual viewpoint, even if that
viewpoint may differ from the majority’s position. Because the death
penalty decision is a value-based moral judgment, the lawyer also can
forewarn jurors that they may find it difficult to articulate the reasons for
their belief that life is the proper sentence, but that does not mean that
the juror’s basis for that judgment is any way illegitimate, or not allowed
by the law.
The closing argument in the Susan Smith case is a masterful
example of a lawyer communicating these themes to the jury. Susan
Smith had done the unthinkable, killing her two children by driving them
88
into a lake and then trying to cast blame on a mysterious black man.
Her lawyers, Judy Clarke and David Bruck, had the difficult task of
trying to convince the jury to suspend their horror long enough to listen
to how a mother had come to kill her own children. To do this, they had
introduced powerful evidence of how Susan had been a victim of incest
growing up and had called upon a full array of witnesses—family
members, school teachers, counselors and a psychiatrist—to convince the
jury that another horror had occurred besides the crime: the swallowing
up of a good person by a horrible depression that led her to do a horrible
89
act.
As David Bruck stood before the jury in Union, South Carolina to
present his closing argument, he first summarized the witnesses’
testimony describing Susan Smith’s hellish descent into depression after
she had become an incest victim. He then picked up the Bible that had
prominently been on the judge’s bench for the entire trial and turned to
the Book of John for a story that was to form the heart of his appeal to
the jury:

87. Although the Supreme Court has struggled with how to characterize the effect jurors are to
give mitigating evidence as part of their decision, see California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541–43 (1987)
(debating how instruction not to rely on “mere sympathy” would affect jurors’ consideration of
mitigating evidence), Justice O’Connor’s statement that jurors are to have a “reasoned moral
response” to the mitigating evidence is frequently cited. Id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
88. Woman Held in Drowning of Two Sons Is Arraigned, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1995, at A10.
89. Transcript of Record at 42, South Carolina v. Smith, Nos. 94-GS-44-906, 94-GS-44-907 (S.C.
July 28, 1995), 1995 WL 789245.
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This Bible has sat on that desk for the whole trial. And each one of
you put your hand on it before voir dire, and every single witness put
their hand on it. And I would submit to you that it may be time to look
inside and see if there is anything in here that bears on the decision
that you have to make. You may not have realized this before, but
there is a death penalty sentencing proceeding in the Gospel. . . . It’s
not a verbatim record, but he took down enough so that we have a very
good picture of what happened in this trial . . . . I think you probably all
know it by heart.
And John’s record of that trial reads like this. “Jesus went unto the
Mount of Olives. And early in the morning he came again into the
temple and all the people came unto him and he sat down and taught
them. And the scribes and Pharisees brought unto him a woman taken
in adultery. And when they had set her in the midst, they say unto him
Master, this woman was taken in adultery in the very act. Now, Moses
in the law commanded us that such should be stoned, but what sayest
thou?”
And then John drops out of the verbatim transcript and explains
what was going on. He says this they said tempting him, that they might
have [grounds] to accuse him. And the background to that is
that . . . the criminal law of the City of Jerusalem at that time was the
Old Testament . . . . And it was written in the Bible that the penalty for
adultery was death by stoning. And if anybody said otherwise, they
were committing the crime of heresy, a blasphemy. And that was a
capital crime. And the people that had asked him that question wanted
him—they thought they had him pegged. You see, they thought that
Jesus was—I guess nowadays we would call it a bleeding heart liberal—
somebody who doesn’t have any concern for the rights of society but
only cares about the poor criminal. They thought they knew—they
thought they could predict what his response would be. . . . And that he
would say something like well, I know it says that in the Bible, but
that’s really a kind of a steep punishment for adultery. And I don’t
really know if that’s—if that would be the right thing to do. Why don’t
you just, you know, do something else, or give her another chance.
And had he said that, that would have been a capital crime. That would
have been blasphemy. . . . But that’s not what he said at all.
Instead of contradicting what [the] law required, he said this. The
first thing he said after they put this trick question to him—the first
thing he did, he stooped down and with his finger wrote on the ground
as though he heard them not. So they pressed on. “So when they
continued asking him, he lifted up himself and said unto them, he that
is without sin among you, let him first cast the stone at her. And then
he stooped down and wrote on the ground. And they which heard it,
being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one,
beginning at the eldest, even unto the last, and Jesus was left alone and
90
the woman standing in the midst.”

By recounting Jesus’s reaction to the Pharisees’ demands, Bruck had
reminded the jury that mercy not only was a value embraced by Jesus,
but also that one can be merciful without violating the law.
90. Id. at *32–33.
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Bruck also realized, however, that the Smith jurors might have a
very human tendency to think of how their decision would be judged by
others, both within their small community and by the world at large,
which was watching through the news media. If they chose a life
sentence, how would they respond to the inevitable questions that they
would receive about not imposing a death sentence on someone who had
killed her own children? He also knew, as many holdouts have said, that
the arguments for life might be hard to articulate in a way that sounded
logical or rational, especially in the face of such a horrible crime. Again,
Bruck returned to the Bible story, asking the jurors to think about what
happened from the perspective of the “jurors” in the Bible story, those
who had listened to Jesus and had chosen not to stone the woman:
Now, of course, we know the rest of the story of Jesus. But we don’t
know the names of any of those people that he spoke to that day, the
ones with the rocks in their hand ready to carry out the death penalty
that was commanded by law. . . . We don’t know their life
stories. . . . They are vanished in the [mists] of time. And we only can
guess. But we can guess what happened next for them, because they
had gone . . . home presumably that night and they saw their friends
and they saw their neighbors. And don’t you know that people
probably asked them what happened? “I bet you really gave it to her.”
And the response would have had to have been “well, no, actually we
didn’t.” And then the next obvious question would be “well, why not?
Didn’t she really do it?” And the response would have had to have
been “oh, no, it wasn’t that. Wasn’t that. She was caught in the act. It
was beyond a shadow of a doubt. She did it all right.”
“Well, what’s up? Why didn’t you do it?” And then you can imagine
the sort of the awkwardness that was followed, how hard it would be to
explain. “Well, I don’t know. We were going to do it, and everybody
was ready to do it, and—well, there was this, you know, preacher there,
and he said some things and it didn’t really make that much sense, but
he wrote on the sand and everything. I don’t really remember what
happened. But it’s just—everybody just kind of changed their mind and
it didn’t seem like that good of an idea. And anyhow, look, we didn’t
do it, okay?”
Don’t you think that’s sort of how the conversation went? And that
was that. And those people probably went through their lives
wondering if they had done the right thing; wondering if they had
maybe failed in their duties as good citizens for the City of
Jerusalem . . . . Of course, we know that they didn’t. They didn’t at all.
We know what happened. We know who touched their hearts, and
how, and why. But they didn’t know that. They were just ordinary
people. There was no explanation of what was happening that they
91
could have. It would be years before the Gospel was written.

By referring to the “ordinary people” who felt moved by Jesus’s words,
Bruck was able to forewarn the Smith jurors that they should not be

91. Id. at *33.
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surprised if they discovered in the jury room that they could not quite
explain fully in words why they feel they should vote for life. He also
touched upon the concern that some jurors might have that they were
“fail[ing] in their duties,” reassuring potential holdouts that to give life
does not mean that they are not carrying out their oath as jurors to
uphold the law. And while a decision for life might cause them some
immediate unease and doubt, viewed through the long lens of history,
they would be joining a line of other “jurors” whose legacy of showing
mercy lasted far longer than any personal discomfort.
Then Bruck specifically reached out to any juror who might find
herself in a holdout’s situation. Turning to the Biblical story one last
time, he reassured any juror who might find herself standing alone that
she is entitled to her opinion, and, indeed, that the pressure she felt to
change her vote might very well be a “test” of her moral courage that she
had to pass, just as the “jurors” to whom Jesus spoke did:
Well, there were some differences between the procedure that was
followed and the law that had to be applied at that sentencing hearing
in the City of Jerusalem nearly two thousand years ago . . . . One is that
your decision must be unanimous. At the temple that day everybody
had their own rock, and anybody who chose to do it could throw that
rock at that woman and smash her with it. . . . [I]n order for her to live,
everybody had to decide not to do that.
Your responsibility is a little different, because your verdict for
death, for death, must be unanimous. In other words, you each have a
stone. . . . [b]ut no stone may be thrown unless all twelve agree. And
what that means as a practical matter, you know, each of the people in
front of the temple that day were tested for each of them. Individually
all . . . passed that test.
The test that the law imposes on you is a little bit different, because
death cannot be imposed unless each of your names appears on this
verdict form. Which means that, unlike the people there that day, it
may not be that all twelve of you will be tested. It could be—I don’t
think this will happen, not from the evidence that we have heard, but it
could—it could happen—that the form will come to you with nine
names already on it, already signed for death, or ten, or eleven, and
only your name is needed to write the verdict for death. That could
happen. And if that does happen, then perhaps the other jurors are not
being tested with you at all. And perhaps only you will be tested and
the other eleven will be part of this test.
Now, I guess you could say that wasn’t really much of a
test . . . [W]ho on earth could think that you should be stoned to death
for committing adultery? Well, that may seem obvious to us today, but
it wasn’t obvious then . . . And there may come a day when our
understanding of mental illness, and of suicide, and of depression, and
of what’s fair and what’s not, advances to the point that it will be
obvious that Susan Smith should not have been sentenced to death.
But apparently it’s not obvious to everyone now. And that’s why this is
a test. If it was easy, it wouldn’t be a test.
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One thing that’s not present in the transcript, according to John, of
that trial is any indication that a prosecutor was there, much less the
prosecutor of the ability of the one that you just heard. And who
knows had there been one reminding people of the harm to the
community and the terrible heinousness of the crime and horror of
what had been done. Who knows if the results might have been
different and that that woman would have died under the pile of rocks.
The whole episode would have been just one more [of] millions of
episodes of man’s inhumanity to man [and] never would have made the
92
Bible and none of us would have ever heard about it.

And, then, anticipating the possibility that a life holdout might feel
overwhelmed by the majority’s insistence that the juror put emotions
aside and be ‘rational,’ he continued:
Judge Howard . . . will list the aggravating factors which you know
about, and he will list the mitigating factors. Mitigating is just a word
that says in favor of life. It means in favor of life for whatever reason.
He will tell you that you are not limited to the mitigating factors that
he and I have been able to think of in the evidence. But you can
consider any reason for life at all that you think is fair.
And then he will also tell you that you can impose life for no reason
at all. That is the law. It doesn’t really mean for no reason at all,
because no one would do something for no reason at all. It means for
the sort of reason that you can’t express, except you feel in your heart
that it’s not the right thing to do. The law recognizes that now as it did
not in Jerusalem two thousand years ago. The instructions in a way
give you permission to do what those jurors that day did. They didn’t
have facts of the crime that made them think that the law didn’t apply
or that death shouldn’t be imposed. They just realized because they
had heard a lesson about humility and the limits of human judgment,
and they saw this woman, and they knew in their hearts that that lesson
applied to this situation and they didn’t take her life. And they couldn’t
have said why. They couldn’t have explained it, but it felt wrong.
What that instruction that you will get from Judge Howard means is
that if it is nothing more than the prompting of your conscience and the
dictates of your heart that makes you hesitate, that makes you doubt,
that makes you wonder whether the death penalty is the right thing to
do, then you are to listen to that, and that is your decision. That is not
violating the law. That is not violating your oath. That is following the
93
law. That is being faithful to your oath.

The Smith jury unanimously returned a verdict for life, but one
cannot help think that if a juror had found himself or herself as a
holdout, bolstered by such a closing argument, the juror just might have
been able to hang on.

92. Id. at *33–34.
93. Id. at *34–35.
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